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P r e f a c e  
I n t e r e s t  i n  human s e t t l e m e n t  systems and p o l i c i e s  h a s  been 
a  c r i t i c a l  p a r t  o f  u r b a n - r e l a t e d  work a t  IIASA s i n c e  i t s  incep-  
t i o n .  Recen t ly  t h i s  i n t e r e s t  has  g i v e n  rise t o  a  c o n c e n t r a t e d  
r e s e a r c h  e f f o r t  f o c u s i n g  on m i g r a t i o n  dynamics and s e t t l e m e n t  
p a t t e r n s .  Four sub - t a sks  form t h e  c o r e  o f  t h i s  r e s e a r c h  e f f o r t :  
I.  t h e  s t u d y  o f  s p a t i a l  r ~ o p u l a t i o n  dynamics;  
11. t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  and e l a b o r a t i o n  o f  a  new r e s e a r c h  
a r e a  c a l l e d  demometrics and i t s  a p p l i c a t i o n  t o  
m i g r a t i o n  a n a l y s i s  and s p a t i a l  p o p u l a t i o n  f o r e -  
c a s t i n g ;  
111. t h e  a n a l y s i s  and d e s i g n  o f  m i g r a t i o n  and s e t t l e m e n t  
p o l i c y ;  
V I .  a  compara t ive  s t u d y  o f  n a t i o n a l  m i g r a t i o n  and se t t l e -  
ment p a t t e r n s  and p o l i c i e s .  
T h i s  p a p e r ,  t h e  second i n  t h e  demometrics series,  a r g u e s  
t h e  need f o r  an  a l t e r n a t i v e  f o r m u l a t i o n  o f  urban  l a b o r  marke t  
dynamics. I t  rev iews  r e c e n t  t h e o r i e s  o f  j o b  s e a r c h  and job  
c r e a t i o n ,  and examines t h e i r  i m p l i c a t i o n s  f o r  i n t e r n a l  m i g r a t i o n .  
R e l a t e d  p a p e r s  i n  t h e  demometrics series,  and o t h e r  p u b l i -  
c a t i o n s  o f  t h e  m i g r a t i o n  and s e t t l e m e n t  s t u d y ,  a r e  l i s t e d  on 
t h e  back page o f  t h i s  r e p o r t .  
Andrei Rogers 
December 1 9 7 6  

A b s t r a c t  
While most c u r r e n t  e m p i r i c a l  urban-growth models emphasize 
t h e  r o l e  o f  urban l a b o r  market  dynamics,  t h e r e  has  been l i t t l e  
d i s c u s s i o n  o f  a l t e r n a t i v e  t h e o r i e s  o f  l a b o r  market behaviour .  
A rev iew o f  t h e o r i e s  o f  job s e a r c h  by l a b o r  f o r c e  members and 
job c r e a t i o n  by f i r m s  i s  und.ertaken. T h i s  r e v e a l s  t h a t  c u r r e n t  
urban-growth models a r e  based on ,  a t  b e s t ,  an  o v e r l y - s i m p l i f i e d  
view o f  l a b o r  market  p r o c e s s e s .  A b e t t e r  t r e a t m e n t  of  long-  
d i s t a n c e  job  s e a r c h  and t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between s e a r c h  and 
m i g r a t i o n  is  s e e n  a s  a  h i g h  p r i o r i t y  i n  f u t u r e  work. Without 
such work, a  t r u e  t e s t  of  i n d u s t r y  v e r s u s  h o u s e h o l d - i n i t i a t e d  
r e g i o n a l  development i s  n o t  p o s s i b l e .  

J O B  SEARCH, M I G R A T I O N ,  AND METROPOLITAN GROWTH 
INTRODUCTION 
One of  t h e  main c o n t r o v e r s i e s  today  i n  urban  and r e g i o n a l  
economics i s  o v e r  t h e  c a u s e s  o f  r e g i o n a l  growth i n  a marke t  
economy. Hi r sch  ( 1 9 7 3 )  has  t y p i f i e d  t h e  two p o l a r  approaches  
i n  t h i s  d e b a t e  a s  t h e  h o u s e h o l d - i n i t i a t e d  and t h e  i n d u s t r y -  
i n i t i a t e d  t h e o r i e s  o f  u r b a n i z a t i o n  and growth. S u p p o r t e r s  o f  
t h e  f i r s t  approach s u g g e s t  t h a t  it i s  t h e  l o c a t i o n a l  behav iour  
and p r e f e r e n c e s  o f  households  which, th rough t h e i r  r o l e s  a s  
consumers o f  goods and s e r v i c e s  and a s  s u p p l i e r s  o f  l a b o u r ,  
de t e rmine  t h e  evo lv ing  s p a t i a l  p a t t e r n  o f  growth and develop-  
ment w i t h i n  a  n a t i o n .  S u p p o r t e r s  o f  t h e  second approach  a r g u e  
t h a t  i n d u s t r y  d e c i d e s  where f u t u r e  growth w i l l  t a k e  p l a c e  and 
t h a t  i n  making such  d e c i s i o n s  f i r m s  a r e  r e l a t i v e l y  i n s e n s i t i v e  
t o  t h e  l o c a t i o n a l  c h o i c e s  and p r e f e r e n c e s  o f  households .  I t  i s  
n o t  d i f f i c u l t  t o  a c c e p t  t h a t  t h e  evo lv ing  p a t t e r n  of  u r b a n i z a t i o n  
w i t h i n  a  n a t i o n  i s  l i k e l y  r e s p o n s i v e  i n  some d e g r e e  t o  b o t h  
k i n d s  o f  i n i t i a t i v e .  The main q u e s t i o n  is  t h e  f o l l o w i n g .  Can 
w e  i d e n t i f y  e m p i r i c a l l y  t h e  r e l a t i v e  r o l e s  t h a t  household-  
i n i t i a t e d  and i n d u s t r y - i n i t i a t e d  s o u r c e s  have p layed  i n  shap ing  
r e c e n t  n a t i o n a l  u r b a n i z a t i o n a l  p a t t e r n s  ? 
T h i s  i s  a  ve ry  impor t an t  p u b l i c  p o l i c y  q u e s t i o n .  I n c r e a s -  
i n g l y ,  governments i n  many c o u n t r i e s  have been t r y i n g ,  f o r  v a r -  
i o u s  r e a s o n s ,  t o  a f f e c t  b o t h  t h e  magnitude and s b a t i a l  p a t t e r n  
of  human s e t t l e m e n t s  w i t h i n  t h e i r  c o u n t r y .  The p o l i c i e s  t h a t  
t hey  would need t o  e f f e c t  t h e s e  changes must be r e l a t e d  t o  a 
view of  what is c a u s i n g  t h i s  s p a t i a l  p a t t e r n  o f  i n d u s t r i e s  and 
households .  I f  i t  i s  mainly household p r e f e r e n c e s  which l i e  
a t  t h e  h e a r t  of  t h e  u r b a n i z a t i o n  p a t t e r n ,  s u c c e s s f u l  p o l i c i e s  
must be  d i r e c t e d  toward a f f e c t i n g  t h e s e .  I f  it i s  t h e  behav iour  
o f  f i r m s  which i s  mainly r e s p o n s i b l e ,  a  d i f f e r e n t  p r e s c r i p t i o n  
i s  i n  o r d e r .  
Most of  t h e  e m p i r i c a l  models of  u rban  economic growth c h a r -  
1  
a c t e r i z e  t h i s  d e b a t e  i n  a  v e r y  s imple  manner . They see t h e  l o -  
c a t i o n a l  p r e f e r e n c e s  and d e c i s i o n s  of households  a s  be ing  r e p r e -  
s e n t e d  s o l e l y  by l o c a l  p o p u l a t i o n  growth ( o r  d e c l i n e )  . They 
t h e n  a s k  whether  t h e  l o c a l  growth i n  employment i s  t h e  c a u s e  o r  
t h e  consequence o f  t h i s  p o p u l a t i o n  growth.  Some of  t h e s e  empir- 
i c a l  models have invo lved  t h e  e s t i m a t i o n  and i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of a  
s imul t aneous  e q u a t i o n  system wherein job  and p o p u l a t i o n  growth 
2 
a r e  b o t h  endogenously r e l a t e d  t o  e a c h  o t h e r  . Mixed f i n d i n g s  
have been o b t a i n e d .  
Although s e v e r a l  models have been e m p i r i c a l l y  t e s t e d ,  t h e r e  
h a s  been v i r t u a l l y  no t r e a t m e n t  o f  t h e  t h e o r e t i c a l  b a s i s  f o r  
such  models.  Each e m p i r i c a l  r e s e a r c h e r  has  used a  d i f f e r e n t  
s t r u c t u r a l  model w i t h  v i r t u a l l y  no r a t i o n a l e  f o r  t h e  c h o i c e  of 
v a r i a b l e s ,  l i n k a g e s  among v a r i a b l e s ,  o r  t i m e  l a g s  used.  More 
i m p o r t a n t l y ,  i f  one  a t t e m p t s  t o  b u i l d  a  t h e o r y  under  t h e s e  
models ,  one  w i l l  g e n e r a l l y  be f o r c e d  t o  r e l y  on a  n o t i o n  of m i -  
g r a t i o n  and j o b  s e a r c h  behaviour  w i t h  which few s o c i a l  s c i e n -  
t i s ts  would f e e l  comfor t ab le .  The p r i n c i p a l  problem h e r e  i s  
t h a t ,  i n  c o n s t r u c t i n g  e m p i r i c a l  models ,  r e s e a r c h e r s  have t a k e n  
t o o  narrow a  view of  t h e  n o t i o n  o f  h o u s e h o l d - i n i t i a t e d  urban-  
i z a t i o n .  T h i s  c a n  be shown i n  t u r n  t o  l e a d  t o  t h e  i n f e r i o r  
n o t i o n  o f  m i g r a t i o n  and job  s e a r c h  j u s t  a l l u d e d  t o .  
T h i s  e s s a y  i s  i n t e n d e d  t o  f l e s h  o u t  t h e s e  arguments .  The 
s p a t i a l  p a t t e r n  of u r b a n i z a t i o n  w i l l  b e  fo rmula t ed  h e r e  a s  t h e  
outcome of a  p r o c e s s  of  urban l a b o u r  marke t  dynamics.  Two 
c l a s s e s  of a c t o r s  a r e  i d e n t i f i e d  i n  t h i s  d i s c u s s i o n ;  f i r m s  and 
l a b o u r  f o r c e  members. The ensu ing  m a t e r i a l  c o n s i d e r s  t h r e e  
q u e s t i o n s .  How do l a b o u r  f o r c e  members e x p r e s s  t h e i r  l o c a t i o n a l  
p r e f e r e n c e  i n  t h e i r  s e a r c h  f o r  b e t t e r  j obs?  How do  f i r m s  i n  a  
g i v e n  l o c a l  l a b o u r  marke t  make t h e i r  h i r i n g  and inves tmen t  
d e c i s i o n s ?  How d o e s  t h e  i n t e r p l a y  between t h e s e  two sets of  
a c t o r s  t r a n s l a t e  i t s e l f  i n t o  a  t h e o r y  o r  model o f  urban  econo- 
m i c  growth? F u r t h e r ,  when answers  t o  t h e s e  q u e s t i o n s  e x p l i c i t l y  
' ~ e f e r  t o  r ev iews  by Miron (1971) and Muth (1975; Chap te r  2 )  . 
2 ~ x a m p l e s  i n c l u d e  Muth (1 971) , Greenwood (1  973) ; ~ a i n  and 
Niede rco rn  (1963) ,  and Alperovich  e t  a l .  (1975) .  
--
c o n s i d e r  a  s p a t i a l  d imens ion ,  t h e  r o l e  o f  l a b o u r  m i g r a t i o n  i n  
l o n g - d i s t a n c e  j o b  s e a r c h  and l o c a l  l a b o u r  marke t  dynamics be-  
comes i m p o r t a n t .  
The stress h e r e  on m i g r a t i o n  behav iou r  has  i ts  b a s i s  i n  
r e c e n t  demographic p a t t e r n s  i n  deve loped  c o u n t r i e s .  I n  such  
c o u n t r i e s ,  t h e  a g e - s p e c i f i c  f e r t i l i t y  and m o r t a l i t y  r a t e s  a r e  
r e l a t i v e l y  homogeneous from one u rban  a r e a  t o  t h e  n e x t .  C i t i e s  
w i t h  h i g h e r  ( o r  lower)  t h a n  a v e r a g e  p o p u l a t i o n  growth  must gen- 
e r a l l y  b e  e x p l a i n e d  i n  t e r m s  of t h e  o n l y  o t h e r  component of 
change;  m i g r a t i o n .  However, many r e s e a r c h e r s  from S j a a s t a d  (3962)  
onward, have  viewed m i g r a t i o n  a s  a n  economic r e s p o n s e  t o  l o c a l  
and e x t e r n a l  l a b o u r  marke t  c o n d i t i o n s .  An emphasis  on t h e  con- 
n e c t i o n  between urban  p o p u l a t i o n  growth and l a b o u r  marke t  con-  
s i d e r a t i o n s  i s  t h u s  u n d e r s t a n d a b l e .  
To p r o v i d e  a  framework f o r  d i s c u s s i n g  j o b  s e a r c h  and migra-  
t i o n  behav iou r ,  t h e  model o f  David (1974) is  examined i n  S e c t i o n  
1 .  I t  i s  p e r h a p s  t h e  b e s t  fo rma l  a t t e m p t  y e t  t.o d e v e l o p  a  micro-  
economic model o f  j ob  s e a r c h  and m i g r a t i o n .  T h i s  model c a n  be  
shown t o  p r o v i d e  a  t h e o r e t i c a l  b a s i s  f o r  t h e  l a b o u r  s u p p l y  ( o r  
p o p u l a t i o n )  growth  e q u a t i o n  o f  a t y p i c a l  e m p i r i c a l  a g g r e g a t i v e  
urban  model. Some major  q u e s t i o n s  a r e  r a i s e d  abou t  t h i s  model 
and i t s  r e l e v a n c e  t o  c u r r e n t  c o n d i t i o n s .  These q u e s t i o n s  are 
shown t o  b e  t i e d  i n  p a r t  t o  t h e  r e s t r i c t e d  view which David 
t a k e s  of  how h o u s e h o l d - i n i t i a t e d  u r b a n i z a t i o n  might  t a k e  p l a c e .  
Some a l t e r n a t i v e  and b r o a d e r  p e r s p e c t i v e s  on job  s e a r c h  b e h a v i o u r  
a r e  t h e n  o f f e r e d  i n  S e c t i o n  2. 
A complementary model o f  j o b  c r e a t i o n  behaviour  i s  c o n s i d -  
e r e d  i n  S e c t i o n  3 .  T h i s  model i s  des igned  t o  emphasize  t h e  i n -  
f o r m a t i o n  which migh t  b e  used  by a  f i r m  i n  making i t s  h i r i n g  and 
inves tmen t  d e c i s i o n s .  The model o f  Mortensen (1970) i s  used  a s  
a  s t a r t i n g  p o i n t  f o r  t h e  development  of a  more g e n e r a l  model.  
F i n a l l y ,  i s s u e s  i n  t h e  l i n k i n g  o f  job  s e a r c h  and j o b  h i r i n g  
models a r e  d i s c u s s e d .  It  i s  shown t h a t  models such  a s  t h o s e  o f  
David and o f  Mortensen can  b e  l i n k e d  t o  p r o v i d e  a  f u l l  model 
of u rban  l a b o u r  marke t  dynamics.  Moreover, t h i s  c o u p l i n g  o f  
theoretical models can be seen as one basis for a typical cur- 
rent empirical model. However, the failure of these theoreti- 
cal models to consider a broader notion of household-initiated 
urbanization makes both the empirical models and themselves 
deficient. 
DAVID'S MODEL OF JOB SEARCH AND MIGRATION: A CRITIOUE 
David uses an analogy to what he refers to as the prospec- 
tive migrant's decision problem. This section begins with an 
outline of that analogy and the parallels drawn. Subsequently, 
consideration is given to the assumptions made and the restric- 
tions this places on migration and job search behaviour. Here, 
the empirical relevance of some assumptions is also questioned. 
For ease of presentation, the assumptions are considered in two 
sets; the prospective migrant's state of knowledge and his meth- 
od of wage sampling. Following this is a discussion of David's 
main findings and the significance these place on his various 
assumptions. Finally, attention is turned to the problems of 
tying David's model to a more general model of urban economic 
growth. 
The analogy used by David may be described as follows. 
... it is best to commence with an analogy of the 
kind calculated to put statisticians at their 
ease. A man has been presented with a set of 
labeled urns, each containing many balls. Every 
ball has a dollar value inscribed upon it, but 
the value of any ball can only be obtained after 
it is withdrawn from the urn. Upon the label of 
each urn appear the parameters of the particular 
probability distribution to which the values of 
the balls therein conform. Also written upon 
every label is the fixed "entry fee" that must 
be paid just for the right to put one's hand 
in the urn, and, further, a schedule of "samp- 
ling charges" describing the (dollar) costs of 
withdrawing different numbers of balls there- 
from. Were our friend able to inventory the 
contents of all the urns and choose a single 
ball on the basis of full knowledge, he would 
prefer the one with the highest value--although 
he might decide that the whole game had not been 
worth the candle. This, however, is not even a 
practicality. He is, instead, required to choose 
an action strategy composed of two elements: He 
must d e s i g n a t e  ( 1 )  t h e  s i n g l e  urn  from which ( 2 )  
a  s p e c i f i e d  number of b a l l s  a r e  t o  be drawn, say ,  
i n  sequence, r e p l a c i n g  each be fo re  e x t r a c t i n g  t h e  
n e x t  and record ing  i t s  va lue .  He w i l l  then  be 
al lowed,  wi thout  f u r t h e r  expense, t o  r e t r i e v e  any 
bal l--and obvious ly  he w i l l  want it t o  be t h e  
h i g h e s t  valued--among t h o s e  comprising t h e  (random) 
sample. How should he proceed i n  making t h i s  
s t r a t e g y  d e c i s i o n ?  I f  g iven a  f i x e d  budget,  how 
should he d i v i d e  it between purchas ing " e n t r y "  
and sampling? And how l a r g e  a  sum should he be 
w i l l i n g  t o  spend i n  t h i s  game? [David; 1974, p.24.1 
The p a r a l l e l s  drawn by him t o  t h e  migra t ion  d e c i s i o n  problem of 
an i n d i v i d u a l  a r e  c l e a r .  
I n  p l a c e  of "urns" we should then  qu ick ly  s u b s t i t u t e  
l o c a l  l a b o r  markets:  r u r a l  d i s t r i c t s ,  towns, c i t i e s ,  
o r  even d i f f e r e n t  c o u n t r i e s .  And i n s t e a d  of " b a l l s , "  
r ead  job o f f e r s .  For s i m p l i c i t y ' s  sake  a  t r a d i t i o n a l  
Japanese  arrangement may be imagined t o  p r e v a i l - -  
permanent job t e n u r e ;  t h e  va lue  of a  job o f f e r  t h u s  
becomes t h e  p r e s e n t  v a l u e  of an annual  wage annu i ty  
r e c e i v e d  over  t h e  remainder of  t h e  worker ' s  ea rn ing  
l i f e .  To what does "sampling" correspond he re?  
Obviously t o  l o c a l  job s e a r c h ,  an a c t i v i t  which i s  
presumed t o  be d i s t i n c t  from employment ( 3 ob t e n u r e )  
and can  ' b e  conducted on ly  a t  some (scheduled)  ex- 
pense t o  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  concerned. S ince  t h e  con- 
templated s e a r c h  i s  t o  be c a r r i e d  on wi th in  t h e  l o -  
c a l  c o n f i n e s  of a  s i n g l e  l o c a l  market ,  w e  must 
suppose t h a t  migra t ion  t h i t h e r  is  a  p r e r e q u i s i t e  
f o r  i t s  conduct .  Hence t h e  f i x e d  " e n t r y  f e e "  t h a t  
appeared (a long wi th  t h e  schedule  of  sampling charges )  
on each u r n ' s  l a b e l  now r e p r e s e n t s  t h e  pure pecuniary  
and psych ic  c o s t s  of t h e  migra t ion  a c t i v i t y  necessa ry  
t o  e f f e c t  e n t r y  i n t o  t h e  r e s p e c t i v e  l o c a l  l a b o r  mar- 
k e t s  from some s tandard-or ig in  p l a c e  i n  t h e  system 
-- the " n u l l  urn"  i n i t i a l l y  i n h a b i t e d  by t h e  prospec-  
t i v e  migran t .  [David; 1974, p. 30.1 
The P r o s p e c t i v e  M i g r a n t ' s  S t a t e  of  Knowledge 
The p r o s p e c t i v e  migrant  i s  assumed t o  be i n  some l o c a l  l a -  
bour market  i n  space .  From t h i s  p o i n t ,  he observes  o t h e r  l a b o u r  
markets  e lsewhere  i n  space a t  which he might be employed. For  
each l abour  market ,  inc lud ing  h i s  own, he knows t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  
3 distribution of wage offers . That is, different firms in the 
same labour market offer different wages for the same employee. 
The prospective migrant does not know beforehand which firm 
offers what wage or even if a firm has an opening for which he 
4 
might be suited . He does know only the probability that any 
given wage offer will turn up next. To find a specific wage 
offer, the job seeker must 'sample' firms. 
The prospective migrant is assumed to be able to attach 
specific values to every job offer. Presumably each city, or 
local labour market, offers a bundle of net amenities to the 
migrant who would choose to live or work there. These, in part, 
would reflect elements entering into the job seeker's locational 
preferences such as climate and residential environment. Within 
David's model, it can be assumed that these are all valued by 
the migrant and included in the 'wage offer' associated with a 
5 job opening in a particular local labour market . 
The Method of Sampling 
David envisages the process of sampling in the following 
way. The job seeker searches within a local labour market by 
6 collecting a set of In' wage offers . How many firms will have 
'HOW does the job seeker form his estimates of the probability 
distribution of wage offers in a particular local labour market? 
David does not consider this question. He does not suggest 
whether these probabilities are exact or subjectively estimated. 
Further, he does not consider these probabilities to be changing 
over time either because of changes in local labour market con- 
ditions or because of the changing perceptions of job seekers. 
4 ~ e  thus has no information by which to orient or make 
systematic his search among firms within a given local labour 
market. The implied randomness of local search is in sharp con- 
trast to his detailed knowledge about the general distribution 
of wage offers in different local labour markets and his rational 
search among these markets. 
5 ~ o  the extent that the migrant is uncertain about how well 
his locational preferences might be satisfied in a given urban 
area, such an approach is over-simplifying his problem. 
6 ~ o  what extent can wage offers be accumulated? As David 
(3974; page 70) admits, there are broad classes of job seekers 
who face offers which are only of the "take it or leave it" var- 
iety. Even for those fortunate enough to get an offer with a non- 
trivial life, the time is usually so short that the job seeker is 
hard-pressed to collect more than one or two additional offers. 
Most job seekers face a decision situation in which job alter- 
natives are too few in number to make David's model useful. 
t o  be sampled t o  come up wi th  t h e s e  In '  o f f e r s  i s  dependent on 
t h e  frequency of occur rence  of  job vacanc ies  among f i r m s .  From 
t h i s  sample, t h e  job seeker  i s  assumed t o  choose t h e  h i g h e s t  
7 
o f f e r  . 
How does t h e  job seeker  ' sample '  f i r m s ?  David has  assumed 
t h a t  t h e  job seeker  must migra te  t o  sample f i r m s  i n  any b u t  h i s  
8  
own p r e s e n t  l o c a l  l abour  market . This  impl ies  t h a t  sampling 
r e q u i r e s  a  p h y s i c a l  c o n t a c t  wi th  t h e  f i rm.  I n  e m p i r i c a l  l abour  
market r e s e a r c h ,  t h i s  most c l o s e l y  corresponds  t o  t h e  ' g a t e  
a p p l i c a t i o n '  s t r a t e g y  which has been found t o  be commonly used;  
9 
e s p e c i a l l y  by c e r t a i n  c a t e g o r i e s  of  workers . There a r e ,  how- 
e v e r ,  a l s o  o t h e r  s e a r c h  methods which do n o t  r e q u i r e  migra t ion  
o r  p h y s i c a l  presence  t o  sample d i s t a n t  l abour  markets .  L e t t e r s  
of i n q u i r y ,  w r i t t e n  responses  t o  r e g i o n a l l y - a d v e r t i s e d  job open- 
i n g s ,  te lephone c o n t a c t ,  and n a t i o n a l  o r  r e g i o n a l  job  placement 
agenc ies  a l l  p rov ide  well-recognized s u b s t i t u t e s  f b r  g a t e  ap- 
p l i c a t i o n s .  
 avid's n o t i o n  of choosing from a  f i x e d  sample i s  s u b j e c t  
t o  some c r i t i c i s m .  Other  r e s e a r c h e r s  would argue  t h a t  uncer- 
t a i n t y  about  t h e  c o s t  of g e n e r a t i n g  an a d d i t i o n a l  wage o f f e r  
makes t h i s  a  problem i n  s e q u e n t i a l  sampling. A f t e r  each i n d i -  
v i d u a l  o f f e r ,  they  would argue  t h a t  t h e  job  seeker  should and . 
does  weigh t h e  c o s t s  of con t inu ing  t h e  s e a r c h  a g a i n s t  t h e  mar- 
g i n a l  expected g a i n  i n  a  subsequent  wage o f f e r .  
8 ~ i n c e  t h e  job  seeker  must migra te  t o  sample f i r m s  i n  o t h e r  
l abour  market a r e a s ,  David views each l o c a l  labour  market a s  d i s -  
t i n c t  geograph ica l ly .  I n  f a c t ,  more t h a n  t h i s  i k  assumed. The 
u s u a l  concept  of  a  l abour  market a r e a  i s  a  f a i r l y  dense  c l u s t e r  
of work-s i tes  surrounded by a  n e t  of  r e s i d e n c e  s i t e s  l y i n g  wi th-  
i n  some maximum commuting range. The maximum commuting range  i s  
p a r t l y  de f ined  by t h e  d a i l y  journey-to-work c o s t  r e l a t i v e  t o  wages 
and p a r t l y  by commuting t i m e  r e l a t i v e  t o  t o t a l  d a i l y  d i s p o s a b l e  
t i m e .  I n  p r a c t i c e  such a  commuting t h r e s h o l d  i s  u s u a l l y  much 
smal le r  than  t h e  s e a r c h  range  of a  job seeker .  That  i s ,  t h e  job  
seeker  is  w i l l i n g  t o  s e a r c h  s p o r a d i c a l l y  f u r t h e r  a f i e l d  t h a n  he  
i s  w i l l i n g  t o  commute on a  d a i l y  b a s i s .  Thus, David assumes both  
t h a t  l o c a l  l abour  markets  a r e  non-overlapping i n  s p a t i a l  t e r m s  and 
t h a t  they  a r e  f u r t h e r  s e p a r a t e d  by more than  t h e  maximum range  ~f  
l o c a l  job  sea rch .  Broad-scale urban conurba t ions  w i t h  i n t e r l i n k e d  
l abour  market commuting o r  s e a r c h  a r e a s  cannot  be handled under 
t h e s e  assumptions.  The model i s  r e l e v a n t  only  f o r  a  widely sep-  
a r a t e d  network of  compact c i t i e s  and t h e s e  a r e  i n c r e a s i n g l y  fewer 
i n  number wi th  t h e  p a s s i n g  of t ime.  
 avid (1974; page 69) himself  draws suppor t  from t h e  f i n d i n g s  
of Reynolds (1951; pp. 214, 215, 2 4 0 ) .  S i m i l a r  arguments w i t h  re- 
s p e c t  t o  young job  s e e k e r s  i n  p a r t i c u l a r  have a l s o  been made by 
Stephenson (1 976; page 108) . 
David does n o t  cons ide r  t h e s e  a l t e r r i a t i v e  s t r a t e g i e s  f o r  
long-d i s t ance  job  s e a r c h .  This  i s  a  c r i t i c a l  o v e r s i g h t .  I n  
h i s  model, households can express  t h e i r  l o c a t i o n a l  p r e f e r e n c e s  
o n l y  by t h e  a c t u a l  a c t  of migra t ing .  
David a l s o  does n o t  cons ide r  t h e  d i s t i n c t i o n  between m i -  
g r a t i o n  and long-d i s t ance  sea rch  t r a v e l .  Migra t ion ,  accord ing  
t o  census  t a k e r s  i s  a  change i n  t h e  p l a c e  of permanent r e s i d e n c e  
from one pre-def ined a r e a  t o  ano the r .  I t  u s u a l l y  i n v o l v e s  a  
movement of household e f f e c t s  and dependents  a s  w e l l  a s  t h e  job 
s e e k e r  h imse l f .  David presumes t h a t  such movement i s  a  p re -  
r e q u i s i t e  t o  job  sea rch .  However, it i s  p o s s i b l e  f o r  a  job  
seeker  t o  be p h y s i c a l l y  p r e s e n t  f o r  s e a r c h  purposes wi thou t  
having t o  move h i s  household e f f e c t s  and fami ly  f i r s t .  Thus, 
i n  a d d i t i o n  t o  being a b l e  t o  s e a r c h  d i s t a n t  markets  wi thout  hav- 
i n g  t o  be p h y s i c a l l y  p r e s e n t ,  t h e  job s e e k e r  a l s o  h a s  a  c h o i c e  
between m i g r a t i o n  and s e a r c h  t r a v e l  i f  he  wants  t o  be  p h y s i c a l -  
l y  p r e s e n t .  Indeed,  such s e a r c h  t r a v e l  may be a  more e f f i c i e n t  
s t r a t e g y  under a  wide set  of c o n d i t i o n s .  Migra t ion  need o n l y  
occur ,  i f ,  i n  t h e  p r o c e s s  of sea rch  t r a v e l ,  t h e  job  s e e k e r  f i n d s  
and a c c e p t s  a  d i s t a n t  job  opening. 
A t  f i r s t  g lance ,  t h i s  may s e e m  a  moot p o i n t .  A f t e r  a l l ,  
one could  rename t h i s  a  ' s e a r c h  t r a v e l ' ,  r a t h e r  t h a n  a  m i g r a t i o n ,  
model and t h e  problem could t h u s  be s imply avoided.  Our i n t e r e s t  
h e r e  i s  p r i m a r i l y  i n  t e r m s  of migra t ion  and urban growth however 
and n o t  s e a r c h  behaviour on i t s  own. To examine m i g r a t i o n  wi th  
t h i s  model, it must be  extended t o  i n c l u d e  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of 
b o t h  m i g r a t i o n  p r i o r  t o  sea rch  ( a s  assumed by David) and migra- 
t i o n  subsequent  t o  a  s u c c e s s f u l  long-d i s t ance  s e a r c h .  H i s  model 
i s  incomple te ,  i n  f a i l i n g  t o  s p e c i f y  t h e  c o n d i t i o n s  under which 
t h e s e  a l t e r n a t i v e  s e a r c h  s t r a t e g i e s  a r e  each op t ima l .  
F u r t h e r ,  David presumes a n  ' i n t e n s i v e '  sampling s t r a t e g y  
i n  two s e n s e s  of t h e  word. F i r s t ,  j ob  s e e k e r s  a r e  assumed t o  
be s e a r c h i n g  f u l l - t i m e  f o r  job  o f f e r s .  During t h e  s e a r c h  p e r i o d ,  
t h e y  must be  o the rwise  unemployed. Th i s  does n o t  p e r m i t ,  f o r  
example, pa r t - t ime  s e a r c h  where a job  s e e k e r  r e t a i n s  a  job  whi le  
s e a r c h i n g  f o r  a  b e t t e r  p o s i t i o n .  David s u p p o r t s  t h i s  argument 
by s u g g e s t i n g  t h a t  a  l a r g e  p r o p o r t i o n  of  workers  u n d e r t a k e  such  
i n t e n s i v e  s e a r c h .  A t  t h e  same t i m e ,  t h e r e  i s  no ev idence  p r e -  
s e n t e d  abou t  t h e  p r o p o r t i o n  of t o t a l  j ob  q u i t s  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  
subsequent  s e a r c h  unemployment. A more g e n e r a l  s e a r c h  model 
would p e r m i t  a  c h o i c e  between i n t e n s i v e  and p a r t - t i m e  s e a r c h  and 
emphasize t h e  d e t e r m i n a n t s  of  such  c h o i c e s .  
The sampling s t r a t e g y  i s  a l s o  i n t e n s i v e  i n  t h a t  o n l y  one  
l o c a l  l a b o u r  marke t  i s  sampled. David does  n o t  c o h s i d e r  a  s t r a -  
t e g y  i n  which t h e  j o b  s e e k e r  samples ,  e i t h e r  s i m u l t a n e o u s l y  o r  
s e q u e n t i a l l y ,  a  series of  marke t s .  H e  would undoubted ly  j u s t i f y  
h i s  approach  on t h e  assumpt ions  t h a t  (i) p r i o r  m i g r a t i o n  i s  nec- 
e s s a r y  and (ii) m i g r a t i o n  c o s t s  a r e  t o o  h i g h  t o  make e x t e n s i v e  
s p a t i a l  sampling economic. However, t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of  sampl ing  
s e v e r a l  marke t s  i n  a  s h o r t  p e r i o d  o f  t i m e  e x i s t s ;  e s p e c i a l l y  when 
sampling i s  n o t  s t r i c t l y  of t h e  g a t e  a p p l i c a t i o n  k ind .  D a v i d ' s  
s i m p l i s t i c  view o f  s e a r c h  behaviour  t h u s  l e a d s  him t o  d i s r e g a r d  
a n o t h e r  i m p o r t a n t  a s p e c t  o f  a  sampling s t r a t e g y .  
I n  c o n c l u s i o n ,  David c o n s i d e r s  a  v e r y  r e s t r i c t e d  k ind  of 
s e a r c h  behav iou r .  No s e a r c h  o c c u r s  w i t h o u t  p r i o r  unemployment 
t h u s  e l i m i n a t i n g  p a r t - t i m e  s e a r c h .  No l o c a l  marke t  s e a r c h  o c c u r s  
w i t h o u t  p h y s i c a l  p r e s e n c e  t h u s  d i s r e g a r d i n g  o t h e r  sampling methods.  
F i n a l l y ,  no change of  l o c a t i o n  i s  p e r m i t t e d  w i t h o u t  c o r r e s p o n d i n g  
m i g r a t i o n  t h u s  e l i m i n a t i n g  l o n g - d i s t a n c e  s e a r c h  t r a v e l .  
Conc lus ions  from Model 
Given t h e s e  a s sumpt ions ,  however f lawed t h e y  might  be ,  David 
i s  a b l e  t o  d e r i v e  some i n t e r e s t i n g  mathemat ica l  r e s u l t s .  Pe rhaps  
t h e  most i m p o r t a n t  i s  an emphasis  on t h e  v a r i a n c e  of  t h e  wage- 
o f f e r  d i s t r i b u t i o n  (deno te  it by a: f o r  l o c a l  l a b o u r  marke t  ' i ' ) .  
T h i s  v a r i a n c e  i s  i m p o r t a n t  i n  two r e s p e c t s .  F i r s t ,  s i n c e  t h e  pro-  
s p e c t i v e  mig ran t  i s  making a  d e c i s i o n  under  u n c e r t a i n t y ,  some no- 
t i o n  o f  r a t i o n a l  r i s k - t a k i n g  behaviour  must  be  s p e c i f i e d .  David 
assumes t h a t  some d e g r e e  of  r i s k - a v e r s i o n  i s  r a t i o n a l  s o  t h a t  t h e  
i n d i v i d u a l  i s  n o t  i n d i f f e r e n t  t o  t h e  v a r i a n c e  of  t h e  wage d i s t r i -  
b u t i o n .  Other  t h i n g s  be ing  e q u a l ,  t h e  r i s k - a v e r s e  i n d i v i d u a l  
would choose  t o  m i g r a t e  t o  t h e  l o c a l  l a b o u r  marke t  hav ing  t h e  
lowest  0:. Secondly, t h e  va r i ance  i s  impor tant  because it h e l p s  
t o  d e f i n e  t h e  expected  maximum o f f e r  i n  a  random sample 06 s i z e  
I n ' .  The l a r g e r  t h e  v a r i a n c e ,  o t h e r  t h i n g s  e q u a l ,  t h e  g r e a t e r  
t h e  expected maximum o f f e r .  Thus an i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  v a r i a n c e  of 
wage d i s t r i b u t i o n  has an undetermined e f f e c t .  On t h e  one hand, 
it i n c r e a s e s  t h e  expected  maximum o f f e r  whi le ,  on t h e  o t h e r ,  it 
i n c r e a s e s  t h e  r i s k  of having t o  a c c e p t  a  low wage. 
Another c o n t r i b u t i o n  of David i s  t o  make t h e  d e c i s i o n  t o  m i -  
g r a t e  and t h e  d e c i s i o n  a s  t o  how long ( o r  ha rd )  t o  o p t i m a l l y  
s e a r c h  s imul taneous .  H i s  model perni i ts  t h e  p r o s p e c t i v e  migran-t 
t o  c o n s i d e r ,  i n  e f f e c t ,  t h e  expected d u r a t i o n  of s e a r c h  unemploy- 
ment a s  one a s p e c t  i n  h i s  cho ice  of where t o  l o c a t e .  Th i s  re- 
p r e s e n t s  one of t h e  f i r s t  a t t empts  i n  t h e  formal. theory  of m i -  
10 g r a t i o n  t o  g i v e  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  t o  t h e  d u r a t i o n  of unemployment = 
A s imple  v e r s i o n  of Dav id ' s  model s e r v e s  t o  i l l u s t r a t e  both  
of t h e  p o i n t s  r a i s e d  s o  f a r .  Consider  a  p r o s p e c t i v e  migrant  who 
c u r r e n t l y  r e s i d e s  and works i n  l abour  market ' a ' .  A s  shown i n  
( I ) ,  t h e  p r e s e n t  v a l u e  of an e a r n i n g s  s t ream a t  ' a '  f o r  t h i s  
worker i s  Ya where ya i s  t h e  ( f i x e d )  annual  income and R i s  t h e  
p r e s e n t  v a l u e  of a  d o l l a r  f low of income over  t h e  w o r k e r ' s  r e -  
maining work- l i f e .  R r e f l e c t s  t h e  d i s c o u n t  r a t e  and t h e  i n d i v i -  
d u a l ' s  work- l i f e  hor izon.  A l t e r n a t i v e l y ,  t h e  worker could choose 
t o  migra te  t o  ' b '  ( t h e  on ly  o t h e r  l abour  marltet i n  t h i s  example) 
and s e a r c h  f o r  ' n '  wage o f f e r s .  A s  i n d i c a t e d  i n  ( 2 ) ,  h i s  annual  
wage would be  t h e  maximum of  t h e s e .  H i s  discoun ted  e a r n i n g s  
s t ream h e r e ,  Yb, i s  s i m i l a r  t o  t h a t  a t  ' a '  excep t  t h a t  i n i t i a l  
s e a r c h  c o s t s ,  S f  a r e  s u b t r a c t e d  o u t .  This  i s  shown i n  i 3 ) .  
The expected  s e a r c h  c o s t s  i n  ( 4 )  i n c l u d e  a  f i x e d  component (so) 
corresponding t o  t h e  migra t ion  c o s t  and a  l o c a l  s e a r c h  c o s t  which 
v a r i e s  wi th  t h e  number of o f f e r s  r e q u i r e d ,  o r  e q u i v a l e n t l y  wi th  
t h e  t i m e  r e q u i r e d  f o r  l o c a l  s e a r c h  a t  ' b ' .  F u r t h e r ,  t h e  
' O ~ l t h o u ~ h  t e  Todaro models, a s  a r e  seen shorLly ,  a l s o  do 
t r e a t  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  of being unemployed i n  a  t ime p e r i o d ,  they  
a r e  n o t  formal  microeconomic models. 
" ~ e t  ' p '  be t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  t h a t  a  f i r m  h a s  a  vacancy. The 
expected  number of f i r m s  a  job seeker  must v i s i t  t o  o b t a i n  ' n o  
o f f e r s  i s  N = n/p. There fo re ,  t h e  expected s e a r c h  c o s t  i s  S  = 
so + ( p s 2 ) N  where s, i s  t h e  marginal  s e a r c h  c o s t  p e r  f i r m .  From 
( 4 )  , it i s  seen t h a t  s l  r e f l e c t s  both  t h e  c o s t  of s e a r c h  p e r  f i r m  
and t h e  1il;elihood of g e t t i n g  a n  o f f e r .  
u t i l i t y ,  W i t  p l a c e d  by a n  i n d i v i d u a l  on t h e s e  d i s c o u n t e d  e a r n i n g s  
s t r e a m s  i s ,  i n  ( 5 ) ,  s u b j e c t  t o  d i m i n i s h i n g  marg ina l  u t i l i t y .  ~ i -  
n a l l y ,  t h e  p r o s p e c t i v e  m i g r a n t s '  d e c i s i o n  problem i s  t o  se lect  a  
l o c a l  marke t  ( a  o r  b )  and,.  i f  ' b ' ,  t o  choose  a n  o p t i m a l  l e v e l  o f  
s e a r c h .  I n  ( 6 ) ,  t h i s  i s  done t o  maximize t h e  e x p e c t e d  v a l u e  o f  
Wi. T h i s  comple tes  t h e  fo rma l  s t a t e m e n t  o f  t h e  model. 
To make t h i s  model o p e r a t i o n a l ,  a  few a d d i t i o n a l  a s sumpt ions  
and d e r i v a t i o n s  a r e  r e q u i r e d .  F i r s t ,  s i n c e  ya i s  d e t e r m i n i s t i c  
Y ( i . e . ,  known), E(Wa) = (Ry,) . On t h e  o t h e r  hand,  ybmax i s  a  
s t o c h a s t i c  v a r i a b l e .  David a r g u e s  t h a t  a  good second-order  ap- 
p rox ima t ion  i s  t h e  f o l l o w i n g .  E(Wb) = R G ~ ~ ~ ~  ( 1  - 6 p y )  - S  where 
- - 2 - - 
= ('bmax - 'bmax 1 ,  P Y  = u y / ~ b m a x t  u; = E ( ~ b m a x  Ybmax ) 2 ,  and  6 = 
[y (1  - y) ] /2 .  Equat ion  (6 )  t h e n  r e d u c e s  t o  ( 7 )  . To e v a l u a t e  
- 
'bmax and u 2  t h e  mean and v a r i a n c e  o f  t h e  ex t reme v a l u e  o f  a  Y '  
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Ybmax = max [yb , y b 2 , .  . . ,ybn 1 I ( 2  
max E ( W ~ )  
i , n  
sample ,  it i s  n e c e s s a r y  t o  i n v o k e  some p a r t i c u l a r  p r o b a b i l i t y  
d i s t r i b u t i o n  f o r  wage o f f e r s .  David assumes wage o f f e r s  a r e  
N (Gb,  u 2 )  . I n  t h a t  c a s e  ybmax and u 2  a r e  approximated  by ( 8 )  Y 
and (9) where A and B a r e  c o n s t a n t s .  
E q u a t i o n s  ( 7 )  t o  ( 1 0 )  form a  comple te  s t a t e m e n t  of t h e  
m i g r a n t ' s  d e c i s i o n  problem. They c a n  b e  s o l v e d  b o t h  f o r  
t h e  w o r k e r ' s  choice .  o f  l a b o u r  marke t  a r e a s  and ,  i f  ' b '  i s  
chosen,  t h e  op t ima l  l e v e l  of sampling. A l t e r n a t i v e l y ,  of c o u r s e ,  
Wb could  be so lved e x p l i c i t l y  f o r  an opt imal  n  and t h e  opt imized 
v a l u e ,  W b * ,  could  be used t o  s o l v e  s e p a r a t e l y  t h e  problem max[Wa, 
wg1 
Severa l  comments a r e  i n  o r d e r  h e r e .  F i r s t ,  t h e  model can 
no t  be a n a l y t i c a l l y  so lved f o r  t h e  opt imal  sample s i z e ,  n.  A l -  
though t h e  economic i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of a n  optimized express ion  
f o r  E(Wb)  i s  c l e a r  enough ( i . e . ,  t h e  marginal  c o s t  of  i n c r e a s i n g  
sample s i z e ,  s , should be equal  t o  t h e  marginal  g a i n s  from 
1 
s e a r c h ) ,  t h e  s o l u t i o n  i s  t r a c t a b l e  on ly  a t  a  numerical  l e v e l .  
Secondly,  t h e  model can be e a s i l y  extended t o  i n c l u d e  sea rch  
w i t h i n  l abour  market ' a '  a s  w e l l .  Thus, t h e  worker would choose 
among t h r e e  s t r a t e g i e s ;  r e t a i n i n g  h i s  c u r r e n t  job,  sea rch ing  i n  
' a '  and s e a r c h i n g  i n  ' b ' .  F i n a l l y ,  t h e  model i s  r e a d i l y  extended 
t o  cover  more than  two l o c a l  l abour  markets .  
The f i n a l  s e t  of r e s u l t s  i n  David ' s  paper  rests on a d d i t i o n a l  
assumptions.  David assumes t h a t  t h e  expected v a l u e  of a  wage o f -  
f e r  i s  everywhere t h e  same. F u r t h e r ,  he assumes t h a t  a l l  l abour  
markets  can be ar ranged according t o  t h e i r  d i s t a n c e  ( o r  migra t ion  
c o s t )  from a  g iven  market .  L e t  s2 ( d )  be t h e  wage v a r i a n c e  of  t h e  
l abour  market  w i t h  t h e  h i g h e s t  v a r i a n c e  a t  d i s t a n c e  I d ' .  I t  i s  
assumed t h a t  S 2 ( d )  i s  a  cont inuous  and i n c r e a s i n g  f u n c t i o n  of I d ' .  
SIMPLIFIED VERSION OF DAVID'S MODEL: TWO LOCAL LABOUR MARKETS 
s u b j e c t  t o :  
I n  t h i s  s p e c i a l  c a s e ,  it is p o s s i b l e  t o  show t h a t  t h e r e  is some 
opt imal  m i g r a t i o n  d i s t a n c e ,  d*.  A s  d  i n c r e a s e s ,  s o  does g 2  (d )  . 
Initially Yn(d), the mean of a sample of n wage offers received 
in the market with the largest variance at d, also increases 
but a decreasing rate. Given a particular wage expectation-- 
variance preference trade-off, d* can then be defined. 
It is difficult to imagine a spatial system of labour mar- 
kets with such a structure of variances; particularly if the 
probability distributions underlying them are objective. David 
comments on this at several points. However, if one adopts the 
view that the wage offer distributions are subjectively based, 
it may be quite reasonable to assume that prospective migrants 
would attach higher variances to further, and less well-known, 
markets. 
Individual ~igration and Aggregate Urban Growth 
To get some perspective on the kinds of aggregative urban 
economic growth models for which theoretical underpinnings are 
being sought, consider the following typical example. Let M(t) 
be the aggregate flow of in-migrants into a local labour market 
less the aggregate flow of out-migrants between It-1' and 't'. 
Let N(t) and L(t) be the number of job openings and the labour 
force present at time 't'. Thus, N(t) - L(t) is the excess of 
job openings over labour supply (i.e., the net level of job va- 
cancies) if positive. If negative, N(t) - L(t) is the excess of 
labour supply over job openings or the net level of local unem- 
ployment. 
A simple and commonly-used model of migration which reflects 
the 'push-pull' hypothesis is the following. 
In general, an excess demand for labour is thus seen to lead to 
a net inflow of migrants while an excess supply leads to a net 
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outflow . Is this aggregate behaviour consistent with David's 
'some researchers such as Cordey-Hayes (1 975) have sug- 
gested that the behaviour of in- and out-migrants should be 
modelled separately. Nonetheless, (11) is widely used as for 
example by Bell (1967). Other researchers suggest that local 
wages are an important determinant of migration. However, (11) 
can be viewed as a reduced form of this if relative wages in 
turn are responsive to the local excess demand for labour. 
model of i n d i v i d u a l  choice?  I n  h i s  model, supply a s p e c t s  of l o -  
c a l  labour  marlcet c o n d i t i o n s  a r e  ignored.  The p r o s p e c t i v e  migrant. 
c o n s i d e r s  only  t h e  labour  demand a s p e c t s ;  t h e  wage o f f e r  d i s t r i -  
b u t i o n  and t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  of g e t t i n g  an o f f e r  from a sarrlpled f i rm.  
The wage o f f e r  d i s t r i b u t i o n  may change over  t i m e  i n  response  t o  
l o c a l  market c o n d i t i o n s .  A s  a consequence, t h e  s h o r t a g e  o r  s u r -  
p l u s  of  l abour  may f o r c e  changes i n  l o c a l  wage r a t e s  which i n  t u r n  
a f f e c t  t h e  p r o p e n s i t y  of a  job seeker  t o  sea rch  t h e r e .  David ' s  
model, being concerned on ly  wi th  t h e  supply s i d e ,  does  n o t  a s s e r t  
how t h e s e  wage changes would come about .  A complementary model 
of wage s e t t i n g  by t h e  f i r m  i s  r e q u i r e d  t o  a s s e s s  such a p rocess .  
The p r o b a b i l i t y  of g e t t i n g  an o f f e r  from a g iven  f i r m  i s ,  
however, more d i r e c t l y  a f f e c t e d  by l o c a l  labour  rnarlcet c o n d i t i o n s .  
This  p r o b a b i l i t y  i s  a f f e c t e d  by t h e  l e v e l  of l o c a l  job  vacanc ies .  
With fewer vacanc ies ,  f o r  example, t h e  job seeker  expec t s  t o  have 
t o  s e a r c h  more f i r m s  t o  g e t  h i s  ' n '  o f f e r s ,  This  r a i s e s  h i s  
s e a r c h  c o s t s  and makes t h e  l o c a l  l abour  marlcet i n  q u e s t i o n  less 
a t t r a c t i v e  a s  a  p l a c e  t o  migra te  t o  and sea rch .  Thus, a  low 
( h i g h )  level -  of job vacanc ies  d i scourages  (encourages)  p o t e n t i a l  
in-migrants .  
To be c o r r e c t ,  t h i s  argument r e l i e s  on a n o t i d n  of t o t a l  
vacanc ies  whi le  (11)  is  based on vacanc ies  n e t  of unemployment. 
The e m p i r i c a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between t h e s e  two i s  q u i t e  s t r o n g  
g e n e r a l l y .  An i n c r e a s e  i n  t o t a l  vacanc ies  i s  almost  always 
accompanied by a r educ t ion  i n  unemployment. S i m i l a r l y  an i n -  
c r e a s e  i n  unemployment, when due t o  a  dec reas ing  demand f o ~  
l a b o u r ,  i s  almost  always accompanied by a r e d u c t i o n  i n  vacanc ies .  
Does David ' s  model i n d i c a t e  anything about  t h e  behaviour of 
- out-migrants?  The model p resen ted  i n  equa t ions  ( I )  t o  ( 5 )  pre-  
sumes t h a t  t h e  job seelcer a t  ' a s  i s  employed. I t  i s  n o t  d i f f i -  
c u l t  t o  extend t h i s  model t o  c o n s i d e r  him a s  unemployed. 
D a v i d ' s  a n a l y s i s  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  an unemployed job seelter a t  ' a d  
w i l l  be more l i k e l y  c e t e r i s  p a r i b u s  than  h i s  employed coun te r -  
p a r t  t o  m i g r a t e  elsewhere i n  s e a r c h  of a b e t t e r  job.  Because 
t h e  unemployed job  seelcer w i l l  have t o  i n c u r  s e a r c h  c o s t s  whe- 
t h e r  he  i s  a t  ' a '  o r  ' b ' ,  he i s  more l i k e l y  t o  be  a f f e c t e d  by 
t h e  d i f f e r e n c e s  between t h e  wage o f f e r  d i s t r i b u t i o n s  of t h e  t w o  
markets than  is an employed worker. Thus, David ' s  model p rov ides  
a  b a s i s  f o r  t h e  push hypo thes i s  i n  ( 1 1 )  t h a t  inc reased  l o c a l  un- 
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employment l e a d s  t o  inc reased  out -migra t ion  . 
Thus, David ' s  model c.an provide  a  g e n e r a l  b a s i s  f o r  ( 1 1 ) .  
Under t h i s  i n t . e r p r e t a t i o n  however, ( 3  1 )  can  be . c r i t i c i z e d  f o r  t h e  
same t h i n g s  t h a t  David ' s  model i s .  I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  it i m p l i c i t l y  
assumes t h a t  t h e  f lows of in-migrants  and out-migrants  c o n s i s t  
mainly of unemployed job seekers .  I f  n o t ,  why should t h e  condi-  
t i o n  of t h e  l o c a l  labour  market m a t t e r  t o  a  p r o s p e c t i v e  migrant? 
3 ~ h i s  d i s c u s s i o n  has  been i n t u i t i v e .  I t  has  been broadly  - 
suggested t h a t  Dav id ' s  model of t h e  i n d i v i d u a l ' s  migra t ion  de- 
c i s i o n  could be aggregated  f o r  a l l  i n d i v i d u a l s  t o  produce a  form 
such a s  ( 1 1 ) .  The e x a c t  proof of t h i s  i s  a c t u a l l y  some way o f f .  
Two main problems emerge i f  one a t t empts  t o  aggregate  over  such 
i n d i v i d u a l  d e c i s i o n s .  F i r s t ,  a r e  t h e r e  d i f f e r e n c e s  among i n d i -  
v i d u a l s  which make simple aggregat ion  d i f f i c u l t ?  Secondly, i s  
t h e r e  a  congruence between t h e  t ime frames used i n  (11)  and on 
David 's  model? 
Consider  t h e  f i r s t  of t h e s e .  Dav id ' s  a n a l y s i s  would sugges t  
f o r  example, t h a t  aggrega t ion  must t a k e  account  of d i f f e r e n t  age 
groups.  Workers i n  d i f f e r e n t  age  groups w i l l ,  of course ,  have 
d i f f e r e n t  va lues  of R ( t h e  p r e s e n t  va lue  of a  l i f e t i m e  s t ream of 
one u n i t  of c u r r e n c y ) .  F u r t h e r ,  workers i n  d i f f e r e n t  age groups  
might be expected t o  f a c e  d i f f e r e n t  wage o f f e r  d i s t r i b u t i o n s  r e -  
f l e c t i n g  t h e i r  l e v e l  of exper ience  and t r a i n i n g  requi rements .  
F i n a l l y ,  they  a l s o  may have varying degrees  of r i s k  avers ion .  
I t  i s  commonly argued,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  t h a t  young workers a r e  more 
prone t o  r i s k  t a k i n g  then  o l d e r  -ones. A l l  of t h e s e  arguments 
sugges t  t h a t  i n  aggrega t ion ,  people i n  d i f f e r e n t  age groups may 
have d i f f e r e n t  v a l u e s  f o r  t h e  parameters  of David ' s  model. S i m -  
i l a r l y ,  o t h e r  k inds  of homogeneous groupings of t h e  popu la t ion  
may be r e q u i r e d  i n  aggrega t ion  each wi th  i ts  own set of parameter  
va lues .  
The second problem i s  t h e  congruence of t ime frames. Nost 
empi r i ca l  urban economic models a r e  based on annual d a t a .  How- 
e v e r ,  e rnni r ica l  work gn labour  market behaviour sugges t s  t h a t  
most employment i s  of r e l a t i v e l y  s h o r t  d u r a t i o n ;  on t h e  o r d e r  
of one t o  two months a - c c o r d i n ~  t o  t h e  U.F. e s t i r w t e s  o f  Bs-rron 
( 1 9 7 5 ) .  To a g g r e g a t e  David 's  model over  c o l l e c t i o n s  of i n d i -  
v i d u a l s  i s  t h u s  no t  enough. Some a t t e n t i o n  must a l s o  be pa id  
t o  t h e  problems of aggrega t ing  i n  a  temporal sense  a s  w e l l .  
This  i s  impor tan t ,  f o r  example, where c u r r e n t  migra t ion  d e c i -  
s i o n s  depend on r e c e n t  p a s t  l abour  market c o n d i t i o n s .  To r e l a t e  
migra t ion  t o  l o c a l  market c o n d i t i o n s  a  month o r  two ago i s  one 
t h i n g .  To a rgue ,  i n  a  temporal ly-aggregated model such a s  ( 1 1 )  
t h a t  migra t ion  depends on l a s t  y e a r ' s  c o n d i t i o n s  is  something 
completely d i f f e r e n t .  No a t tempt  has been made s o  f a r  t o  re- 
c o n c i l e  t h e s e  two t ime frames. 
Here i s  t h e  major c o n t r i b u t i o n  of Dav id ' s  model. By c l a r i f y i n g  
t h e  assumption of migra t ion  p r i o r  t o  s e a r c h ,  t h e  f a u l t  wi th  ( 1 1 )  
i s  made c l e a r .  While it may be  t r u e  t h a t  l o c a l  l abour  market  
c o n d i t i o n s  encourage job s e e k e r s  t o  s e a r c h  w i t h i n  ( o r  o u t s i d e )  
t h e  market ,  it i s  n o t  t r u e  t h a t  t h i s  need imply migra t ion .  The 
f a u l t  wi th  (11)  and w i t h  s i m i l a r  k inds  of  e m p i r i c a l  m i g r a t i o n  
e q u a t i o n s  a r e  t h a t  t h e y  sugges t  an over - s impl i f i ed  view of  t h e  
job  s e a r c h  p rocess .  
ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON JOB SEARCH 
Given t h e s e  c r i t i c i s m s  of David ' s  approach,  it i s  i n s t r u c -  
t i v e  t o  a s k  how a l t e r n a t i v e  models of job seeker  behaviour might 
be formula ted .  The long-run purpose i n  a sk ing  t h i s  q u e s t i o n  i s  
t o  develop some models of i n d i v i d u a l  behaviour which a r e  more 
c o n s i s t e n t  wi th  t h e  range  of s e a r c h  s t r a t e g i e s  open t o  i n d i v i -  
d u a l s  and which could  t h e n  be aggregated  t o  y i e l d  new empi r i ca l  
m i g r a t i o n  e q u a t i o n s  t o  r e p l a c e  ( 1 1 ) .  Like  a l l  long-run purposes ,  
t h e r e  i s  much t o  be done b e f o r e  t h i s  can  be achieved.  The i m -  
media te  purpose of t h i s  s e c t i o n  i s  t o  examine some of t h e  cur -  
r e n t  approaches t o  job s e a r c h  t h e o r y  t o  s e e  what t h e  major is- 
s u e s  a r e  i n  t h e  d e s i g n  of models of job  seeker  behaviour .  
Two broad s e t s  of  i s s u e s  a r e  i d e n t i f i e d .  One has  t o  do 
w i t h  t h e  g e n e r a l  s e t t i n g  w i t h i n  which job  s e a r c h  behaviour i s  
examined. The o t h e r  t r e a t s  q u e s t i o n s  about  t h e  c h o i c e s  open t o  
t h e  job s e e k e r  and h i s  opt imal  c h o i c e  under d i f f e r e n t  assump- 
t i o n s  about  r - a t i o n a l i t y .  This  s e c t i o n  i s  concluded wi th  an 
assessment  of t h e  d i r e c t i o n s  i n  which job  s e a r c h  and m i g r a t i o n  
models should be  headed. 
The Problem S e t t i n g  
The 'problem s e t t i n g '  i n c l u d e s  a grab-bag of d i f f e r e n t  
a s p e c t s .  One of t h e s e  i s  t h e  number of d i f f e r e n t  ways i n  which 
r e s e a r c h e r s  have tended t o  t r e a t  space  i n c l u d i n g  t h e  number of 
(and s e p a r a t i o n  among) l o c a l  l abour  markets .  Another concerns  
t h e  d i f f e r e n t  assumptions by r e s e a r c h e r s  about  t h e  knowledge 
( o r  degree  of u n c e r t a i n t y )  possessed  by job s e e k e r s .  A f i n a l  
a s p e c t  c o n s i d e r e d  i s  t h e  d i f f e r e n t  ways i n  which t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  
o f  f i n d i n g  a j o b  o f f e r  i n  a u n i t  o f  t i m e  i s  h a n d l e d .  These  a re  
now c o n s i d e r e d  i n  more d e t a i l .  
The S p a t i a l  S e t t i n g  
I n  t h e  t r e a t m e n t  o f  a  s p a t i a l  s e t t i n g ,  D a v i d ' s  model i s  t h e  
m o s t  a m b i t i o u s  j o b - s e a r c h  model  t o  d a t e .  The o n l y  o t h e r  s p a t i a l  
m o d e l s ,  i n  a n y  s e n s e ,  h a v e  been  t h o s e  o f  Todaro  (1969)  a n d  
Zarembka (1970a  a n d  1 9 7 2 ) .  Those  a r e  c o n c e r n e d  w i t h  r u r a l - u r b a n  
m i g r a t i o n  and assume o n l y  t w o  c o r r e s p o n d i n g  l a b o u r  m a r k e t  a r e a s .  
D a v i d ' s  mode l ,  by  c o n t r a s t ,  a l l o w s  f o r  a n y  number o f  l o c a l  ( r u r a l  
o r  u r b a n )  l a b o u r  m a r k e t s .  
Does t h e  m u l t i - m a r k e t  a s p e c t  o f  D a v i d ' s  model  g e n e r a t e  any  
new i n s i g h t s ?  The answer  i s  n e g a t i v e  b e c a u s e  o f  two c r i t i c a l  
a s s u m p t i o n s  made by him. By assuming  s p a t i a l l y  d i s t i n c t  l a b o u r  
m a r k z t  and s e a r c h  a r e a s ,  h e  i s  u n a b l e  t o  c o n s i d e r  r e l e v a n t  phe- 
nomena s u c h  a s  i n t e r a r e a  j o b  commuting o r  s e a r c h .  H i s  s p a t i a l  
s e t t i n g  i n  t h i s  r e g a r d  i s  m o r e  r e m i n i s c e n t  o f  a n i n e t e e n t h  c e n -  
t u r y  u r b a n  s y s t e m  t h a n  o f  a c o n t e m p o r a r y  one .  F u r t h e r ,  by a s -  
suming a  d i s t a n c e - d e p e n d e n t  maximum wage v a r i a n c e ,  h e  h a s  c r e a t e d  
a n  u n r e a l i s t i c  u r b a n  s e t t l e m e n t  sys tem.  A l t h o u g h  h i s  model  may 
b e  u s e d  n u m e r i c a l l y  i n  i n t e r e s t i n g  a p p l i e d  a n a l y s e s ,  it i s  d o u b t -  
f u l  t h a t  t h e  m u l t i - m a r k e t  a s p e c t  i s  h e l p f u l  i n  a t h e o r e t i c a l  
model .  P u s h i n g  t h i s  a t t a c k  f u r t h e r ,  it i s  n o t  C l e a r  t h a t  a n y  
u s e f u l  t h e o r e t i c a l  i n s i g h t s  c a n  b e  formed which  would n o t  b e  
a v a i l a b l e  i n  a two (or  a t  m o s t  a t h r e e )  m a r k e t  model .  A l t h o u g h  
f u t u r e  t h e o r e t i c a l  mode l s  s h o u l d  b e  r e s t r i c t e d  t o  s u c h  s m a l l  
u r b a n  s y s t e m s ,  t h i s  a rgument  o f  c o u r s e  d o e s  n o t  d e n y  t h e  u s e f u l -  
n e s s  o f  a l a r g e - s c a l e  m u l t i - m a r k e t  a p p r o a c h  i n  e m p i r i c a l  m o d e l s .  
An a d d i t i o n a l  i s s u e  h e r e  is w h e t h e r  l o c a l  l a b o u r  m a r k e t s  
s h o u l d  b e  t r e a t e d  as  area-less p o i n t s  i n  s p a c e .  S c h n e i d e r  (1975)  
c o n s i d e r s  a model w h i c h  e x p l i c i t l y  a n a l y z e s  areal  fo rm i n  s t u d y i n g  
s e a r c h  i n  a n  u r b a n  m a r k e t .  T h i s  model  e m p h a s i z e s  s e a r c h  by phy- 
s ica l  c o n t a c t  a n d  t h e  n e c e s s i t y  o f  moving a l o n g  p a t h s  be tween  
f i r m s  b e i n g  s e a r c h e d .  How r e l e v a n t  t h i s  a p p r o a c h  i s  t o  a g g r e g a t e  
u r b a n  l a b o u r  m a r k e t  mode l s  i s  a n  open  q u e s t i o n .  S c h n e i d e r ' s  m o -  
d e l  d o e s  n o t  c o n s i d e r  t h e  u s e  of  o t h e r  s e a r c h  t o o l s  s u c h  a s  
telephones, letter writing, and job vacancies which alleviate the 
need for purely physical spatial search. The gains from con- 
sidering simple point markets seem, in conclusion, to outweigh 
the restrictive complexity of the areal market models developed 
so far. 
Uncertainty and Search 
In David's model it has been assumed that the job seeker is 
uncertain only about the wage offer, if any, of a particular firm. 
It has also been assumed that he knows the mean and variance of 
the (Normal) wage distribution in each labour market. Further, 
the worker is assumed to know that any wage offer can be kept 
open until he finishes collecting his sample. Finally, it is 
assumed that the job seeker can assess all the additional ele- 
ments intrinsic to a given job opening (e.g. work environment 
and job stability) and include these in an overall 'wage' mea- 
sure. Are these realistic assumptions for a broad sector of 
workers in a contemporary society? Alchian (1970) and others 
have attacked the assumption that the parameters of the wage 
distribution are known. They perceive the employed labour 
force member to be cognizant only of the wage rate he himself 
has received in the past and is currently receiving. A less- 
than-average change in this rate, relative to past changes, 
will cause the worker to quit and search for work elsewhere in 
the perhaps mistaken belief that his firm is not being compet- 
itive. Such behaviour, because the worker is uninformed about 
average market wages, leads to a 'wage illusion' in which the 
worker accepts a certain wage rate without knowing how large 
it is relative to other wages. Parsons (1973) in an empirical 
study of quit rates finds no support for such a wage illusion. 
His findings are consistent with the idea that workers are broad- 
ly aware of average wages. Thus, although they may not know 
much about the other parameters of a wage distribution, they 
are at least generally aware of its expected value. 
As indicated earlier, it seems unreasonable that a wage 
offer can be kept open until a large (n > 3) sample is collected. 
Several researchers, including McCall (1970), have constructed 
models which relax this assumption. They find the optimal 
strategy is a sequential one in which, after each wage offer, 
the job seeker weighs the relative cost of finding an additional 
offer against the expected gain which that new offer would repre- 
sent. A sequential strategy has been shown by McCall and others 
to lead to a 'reservation wage1. The individual would choose, 
under this strategy, to stop searching with the first offer ex- 
ceeding this reservation wage. The reservation wage approach 
has not yet been integrated into a model of migration behaviour. 
There is, however, a more fundamental issue here. Both the 
fixed-sample and the reservation wage strategies emphasize the 
dispersion of wages in a local labour market as the prime source 
of uncertainty underlying the job-seeker's problem. Is such a 
dispersion the essential source of uncertainty underlying migra- 
14 tion behaviour ? Some researchers, particularly Todaro (1969) 
and Zarembka (1 970 and 1972) , emphasize the uncertainty of job 
finding alone. In their models, they assume that all jobs carry 
the same wage thereby eliminating wage dispersion. The prospec- 
tive migrant has a known and fixed probability of finding a job 
in any period of time and this constitutes the only uncertainty 
facing him. Such an approach is quite attractive because it 
makes the informational requirements for a migration decision 
much smaller. What emphasis should be placed on job finding 
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versus wage dispersion is still an open empirical question . 
As a final issue here, one might ask how the job seeker 
weighs one important intrinsic element of a given job; its ex- 
pected duration. David has assumed that the job seeker believes 
that a job opening will last the rest of his lifetime. This, 
1 4 ~ h e  basic search theory models have often been criticized 
for their reliance on wage dispersion. In addition to empirical 
doubts, Rothschild (1972; p. 12881, and others have questioned 
the theoretical basis of such dispersion. 
5 ~ s  an example of the fragmented evidence available, 
Stephenson (1976; p. 110) suggests that about 90% of young U.S. 
job-seekers accept the first job offered to them. 
however,  i s  a  p o l a r  c a s e .  More g e n e r a l l y ,  t h e  worker  b e l i e v e s  a  
j o b  w i l l  have a  f i n i t e  l i f e  a l t h o u g h  he may be  unsu re  a b o u t  how 
3 6  l o n g  t h i s  w i l l  b e  . 
A j ob  may t e r m i n a t e  f o r  s e v e r a l  main r e a s o n s ;  r e t i r e m e n t ,  
q u i t t i n g ,  and l a y o f f .  The r e t i r e m e n t  e f f e c t  h a s  a l r e a d y  been 
c o n s i d e r e d  i n  D a v i d ' s  model i n  t e r m s  o f  t h e  d i s c o u n t e d  s t r e a m  
f a c t o r  R.  No p r e s e n t l y - a v a i l a b l e  s e a r c h  model c o n s i d e r s  f u t u r e  
' v o l u n t a r y '  q u i t s  ( f o r  t h e  pu rpose  of  t a k i n g ,  o r  s e a r c h i n g  f o r ,  
a  b e t t e r  j ob )  i n  t h e  j ob - seeke r s  c u r r e n t  d e c i s i o n  problem. A 
s i m p l e  d i s c o u n t e d  e a r n i n g s  s t r e a m  approach ,  such  a s  t h a t  of 
David,  u n d e r s t a t e s  t h e  t r u e  expec ted  e a r n i n g s  s t r e a m  by i g n o r i n g  
t h e  e x p e c t e d  income g a i n  from f u t u r e  s e a r c h .  T h i s  c o u l d  c a l l  
f o r  a  d r a s t i c a l l y  d i f f e r e n t  c h o i c e  from t h e  one d i c t a t e d  by 
D a v i d ' s  model. L a y o f f s  o r  ' i n v o l u n t a r y '  q u i t s  ( i . e . ,  n o t  q u i t -  
t i n g  t o  s e a r c h  f o r  o r  t a k e  up  a  b e t t e r  j ob )  a r e  n o t  g e n e r a l l y  
c o n s i d e r e d  i n  t h e  l i t e r a t u r e  e i t h e r .  These t o o  may have a  s i g -  
n i f i c a n t  e f f e c t  on t h e  p r o s p e c t i v e  m i g r a n t ' s  d e c i s i o n  by making 
a  s i m p l e  d i s c o u n t e d  e a r n i n g s  s t r e a m  o v e r s t a t e  t h e  expec ted  t r u e  
s t r e a m  of  e a r n i n g s .  
To i n c o r p o r a t e  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  t h e s e  l a s t  two k i n d s  o f  
j o b  t e r m i n a t i o n ,  more i n f o r m a t i o n  i s  r e q u i r e d  by t h e  prospec-  
t i v e  m i g r a n t .  H e  needs  t o  have  some i d e a  a b o u t  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  
o f  l a y o f f  i n  e a c h  o f  t h e  l o c a l  l a b o u r  m a r k e t s .  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  
f o r  each  l a b o u r  marke t ,  he  needs  t o  e v a l u a t e  t h e  l i k e l i h o o d  
t h a t  f u t u r e  s e a r c h  w i l l  become p r o f i t a b l e .  The l a t t e r  might  
i n c l u d e ,  f o r  example,  a n  e x p e c t a t i o n  a b o u t  t empora l  s h i f t s  i n  
t h e  wage d i s t r i b u t i o n  of  a  l o c a l  marke t  r e l a t i v e  t o  c u r r e n t  
c o n d i t i o n s .  I t  is u n c l e a r  a s  y e t  j u s t  what s o u r c e s  t h e  prospec-  
t i v e  m i g r a n t  t e n d s  t o  u s e  i n  e s t i m a t i n g  such  i n f o r m a t i o n .  
A s m a l l  example i l l u s t r a t e s  t h e  r o l e  of u n c e r t a i n t y  a b o u t  
l a y o f f  on t h e  p r o s p e c t i v e  m i g r a n t ' s  c h o i c e .  Suppose t h a t  a  j o b  
s e e k e r  i s  c o n s i d e r i n g  s e a r c h i n g  some p a r t i c u l a r  l o c a l  l a b o u r  
marke t .  Assume t h a t  he  knows t h e  o n l y  wage, w ,  which c a n  b e  
6 ~ t e p h e n s o n  ( 3  976; p .  109) a l s o  p r e s e n t s  ev idence  s u g g e s t i n g  
t h a t ,  among young U.S. j o b  s e e k e r s ,  t h e  o l d e r  t h e  j ob  s e e k e r  t h e  
l o n g e r  he e x p e c t s  h i s  n e x t  j o b  t o  l a s t .  
obtained there. Further, assume he knows the probability, p, of 
finding a job opening and the probability, q ,  of being laid off 
involuntarily during a period. 
Given that the job seeker is unemployed at the outset (t = 01, 
can we find the probability, et, that he is employed at time 't'? 
1 7  Let ut be the probability that he is unemployed and Yt = [u elt, . 
The earlier assumptions define a Markov model of the form 
- 
Yt - Yt-l A where A = (1-q) I
From this, 
t As Howard (1971; pp. 63-64)  indicates, A has a closed form 
solution. 
Given the prior assumption that uo = 1, it is now easily seen 
that 
The expected value of the discounted flow of future earnings 
can now be calculated. Assume a discount rate of 'r' and that 
there are no unemployment benefits. The expected discounted 
earnings stream, U, is given by 
17~oting, of course, that ut + et = 1. 
S u b s t i t u t i n g  from ( 1 4 )  and l e t t i n g  t h e  worker ' s  t ime hor izon ,  T I  
be l a r g e ,  one g e t s  a s  an approximation 
Equation ( 1 6 )  can be expressed i n  a  number of ways. L e t  us  
assume t h a t  t h e  worker has  a  f i x e d  l e v e l  of U ,  say  Uo,  i n  mind. 
Re-arranging ( 1  6 )  i n  t h i s  c a s e  y i e l d s  
T h i s  equa t ion  t i e s  t o g e t h e r  t h e  t h r e e  l o c a l  market v a r i a b l e s ;  q ,  
p ,  and w.  Given t h a t  t h e  job  seeker  wants t o  maximize U ,  ( 1  7 )  
i n d i c a t e s  i n d i f f e r e n c e  curves  among t h e s e  t h r e e  v a r i a b l e s 1  ' . For 
example, t h e  job  s e e k e r  i s  i n d i f f e r e n t  t o  a  h i g h e r  q u i t  r a t e  
provided t h a t  it i s  accompanied by a  h igher  wage o r  h i g h e r  job- 
f i n d i n g  p r o b a b i l i t y .  
The P r o b a b i l i t y  of Job F ind ins  
Whatever t h e  emphasis on wage d i s p e r s i o n ,  some a t t e n t i o n  
must be focussed on u n c e r t a i n t y  i n  t h e  s e a r c h  f o r  job  openings.  
T h i s ,  we may summarize by t h i n k i n g  of t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  t h a t  a  
job s e e k e r  w i l l  l o c a t e  any opening e i t h e r  while  sea rch ing  a  f i r m  
o r  dur ing  a  g iven  t ime pe r iod .  How would one measure t h i s  prob- 
a b i l i t y ?  What a r e  i t s  determinants?  
' ~ o t e  t h a t  t h e  c o e f f i c i e n t  of  ' p '  i n  ( 1 7 )  is p o s i t i v e .  
From ( 1 6 ) ,  
There  a r e  s e v e r a l  ways i n  which one c o u l d  measure t h e  prob- 
a b i l i t y  of  g e t t i n g  a  j o b  o f f e r  d u r i n g  a p e r i o d .  These may be 
b r o a d l y  c l a s s i f i e d  a c c o r d i n g  t o  how one would view t h e  h i r i n g  
behaviour  o f  f i r m s .  One p o s s i b i l i t y  i s  t h a t  f i r m s  m a i n t a i n  
w a i t i n g  l i s t s  of a c c e p t a b l e  j o b  a p p l i c a n t s .  The f i r m  would 
make a v a i l a b l e  a  j o b  opening o n l y  t o  t h e  f i r s t  p e r s o n  on t h i s  
l i s t  and t h e  p e r s o n ' s  name would be dropped from t h e  l i s t ,  sub- 
s e q u e n t l y ,  r e g a r d l e s s  of  whether  h e  a c c e p t s  o r  r e j e c t s  t h e  o f f e r .  
An o p p o s i t e  view of  t h e  h i r i n g  p r o c e s s  would be  t h a t  no w a i t i n g  
l i s t s  a r e  m a i n t a i n e d .  I n  t h i s  c a s e ,  a  j o b  opening i s  o f f e r e d  
t o  t h e  n e x t  a p p l i c a n t  who a p p e a r s .  These two a l t e r n a t i v e  v iews 
of t h e  h i r i n g  p r o c e s s  r e s u l t  i n  d i f f e r e n t  k i n d s  of j o b - f i n d i n g  
p r o b a b i l i t y  measures .  
L e t  u s  l o o k  more c a r e f u l l y  a t  t h e  ' w a i t i n g  l i s t '  o r  queue- 
i n g  model of  j o b  h i r i n g .  Suppose t h a t  a  job-seeker  randomly 
v i s i t s  N f i r m s  d u r i n g  a p e r i o d  of  which n on a v e r a g e  f i n d  him 
a n  a c c e p t a b l e  a p p l i c a n t .  Then, p l  = n/N i s  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  t h a t  
a  f i r m  w i l l  make him a job  o f f e r  a t  some t i m e .  T h i s  o f f e r  may 
come immedia te ly  b u t ,  g e n e r a l l y ,  may come s u b s t a n t i a l l y  a f t e r  
t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n .  The p r o b a b i l i t y  p ( t )  t h a t  h e  g e t s  an  o f f e r  
d u r i n g  a t i m e  i n t e r v a l  ' t '  i s  dependent  on p l ,  on t h e  magni tudes  
of  t h e  w a i t i n g  l i s t s  of  f i r m s ,  and on t h e  r a t e  o f  o c c u r r e n c e  o f  
j o b  v a c a n c i e s .  I n  g e n e r a l ,  p ( t )  w i l l  be n e a r  z e r o  when t h e  j o b  
s e e k e r  i n i t a l l y  b e g i n s  s e a r c h i n g  b u t  w i l l  i n c r e a s e ,  a t  l e a s t  t o  
some l e v e l ,  w i t h  h i s  d u r a t i o n  o f  s e a r c h .  No a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  t h i s  
approach h a s  been found i n  t h e  job  s e a r c h  l i t e r a t u r e  a l t h o u g h  
t h i s  queueing model seems t o  b e  a  r e a l i s t i c  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  o f  
many j o b  s e a r c h  problems.  
The a l t e r n a t i v e  view of t h e  h i r i n g  p r o c e s s  i n  which no w a i t -  
i n g  l i s t s  a r e  m a i n t a i n e d ,  might  be  r e f e r r e d  t o  a s  t h e  ' b i n g o '  
model. Here t h e r e  are a t  l e a s t  two d i f f e r e n t  measures o f  t h e  
p r o b a b i l i t y  of  f i n d i n g  a job .  One i s  t h e  measure used ,  f o r  
example, by David and by Barrow ( 1 9 7 5 ) .  During a s m a l l  i n t e r v a l  'Of 
t i m e ,  o n l y  a  c e r t a i n  p r o p o r t i o n  of  f i r m s ,  s a y  p l ,  have one  o r  mor$ 
19 job  open ings  o f  a t y p e  s u i t a b l e  t o  t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  j o b  s e e k e r  . 
 arrow assumes,  more s t r i c t l y ,  t h a t  no f i r m  h a s  more t h a n  
one  vacancy ( o f  a g i v e n  t y p e )  a t  a  g i v e n  t i m e .  
I f  a  job s e e k e r  happens t o  f i n d  a  f i r m  wi th  such a  vacancy, t h i s  
p o s i t i o n  i s  assumed t o  be o f f e r e d  t o  him. Thus, i n  t h e  David- 
Barrow view, t h e  job seeker  who engages in. ra.ndom s e a r c h  has a  
p r o b a b i l i t y  p, of g e t t i n g  an o f f e r  from a  f i rm.  F u r t h e r ,  i f  
it t a k e s  m >. 1 t ime p e r i o d s  t o  s e a r c h  one f i r m ,  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  
of g e t t i n g  an o f f e r  i n  a  u n i t  t ime i s  p  = p,,/m. 
An a l t e r n a t i v e  d e f i n i t i o n  of t h i s  pkobabi l - i ty  i n  t h e  bingo 
model has been suggested by Todaro ('1969). He iinagiries a  l a b o u r  
market where a l l  new job openings a r e  f i l l e d  w i t h i n  one pe r iod  
of t ime and t h a t  t h e s e  p o s i t i o n s  a r e  f i l l e d  randomly from among 
t h e  ranks  of a  l a r g e  s t o c k  of unemployed20. Given O t  openings 
i n  t h e  l o c a l  l abour  market a t  t ime I t '  and U t  unemployed job  
s e e k e r s ,  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  t h a t  a  job seelcer w i l l  g-et a n o f f e r  i s  
p ( t )  = O t / U t "  
These two defini . t i .ons of t h e  job--f ind ing  p r o b a b i l i t y  i n  a 
bingo model s h a r e  c e r t a i n  f e a t u r e s .  They a r e  both  o b j e c t i v e l y  
determined by c o n d i t i o n s  i n  t h e  l o c a l  l abour  market.  They both 
s e e  t h e  h i r i n g  of workers a s  a  kind of random cho ice  among t h e  
unemployed job  s e e k e r s .  They both  r e q u i r e  t h a t  t h e  job s e e k e r  
have some i d e a  of t h a  r a t e  of job c r e a t i o n  by f i r m s  i n  a  g iven 
l o c a l  l a b o u r  market.  F i n a l l y ,  n e i t h e r  s e e s  t h e  d u r a t i o n  of an 
i n d i v i d u a l ' s  s e a r c h  a s  a f f e c t i n g  l p q  21 .  I n  f a c t ,  if t h e  g e n e r a l  
l abour  market c o n d i t i o n s  remain c o n s t a n t  s o  does ' p ' .  
2 0 ~ h i s  i s  i n  c o n t r a s t  t o  .the David-Barrow model where an 
opening i s  f i l l e d  in a  p e r i o d  on ly  i f  E;n a p p r o p r i a t e  a p p l i c a n t  
appears .  
2 1 ~ o m e  o b j e c t i o n s  t o  t h e  b a s i c  assumptions of t h e  bingo 
model r a i s e  ques t ions  about  t h e  e f f e c t  of s e a r c h  d u r a t i o n  on ' p ' .  
S e v e r a l  r e s e a r c h e r s ,  i n c l u d i n g  Zarembka (1972; pp. 54-58),  have 
sugges ted  t h a t  job s e a r c h  invo lves  s k i l l s  which muat be l e a r n e d .  
They s e e  t h e  sampling of f i r m s  n o t  a s  a  p u r e l y  random process  bu t  
a s  one i n  which t h e  job se.eker becomes i n c r e a s i n g l y  adep t  a t  
d i s c o v e r i n g  f i r m s  w i t h  vacancies .  Thus, t h e  indi.vidua1 job 
s e e k e r  has h i s  owil ' p P  which i n c r e a s e s  b ~ i t h  s e a r c h  d u r a t i o n .  
An a l t e r n a t i v e  argument has  been developed hy S a l o ~  (1972) 
t o  suggest ,  t h a t  job  s e e k e r s  a r e  r e l a t i v e l y  good dt picl t ing o u t  
high-wage and l i k e l y  employers. I n  s y s t e m a t i c  s e a r c h i n g ,  t h e  
job  s e e k e r  w i l l  s e a r c h  t h e s e  f i r m s  f i r s t  and w i l l  only  subse-  
q u e n t l y  s e a r c h  low-wage, l e s s - l i k e l y  employers. I n  t h i s  con- 
t r a s t i n g  view, ' p '  w i l l  d e c r e a s e  wi th  t h e  d u r a t i o n  of s e a r c h .  
I t  i s  improbable t h a t  s e a r c h  l e a r n i n g  and s y s t e m a t i c  s e a r c h  
e f r e c t s  e x a c t l y  c a n c e l  each o t h e r  o u t  bu t  t h e  n e t  e f f e c t  on ' p '  
of s e a r c h  d u r a t i o n  i s  an  e m p i r i c a l  i s s u e  i f  one a c c e p t s  t h e  
bingo model a s  a r e a l i s t i c  approxin1atj .0~. 
A r e  t h e r e  any r e a s o n s  f o r  p r e f e r i n g  e i t h e r  a  queue ing  o r  a  
b ingo  model? I n  terms of  r e a l i s m ,  t h e  b ingo  model seems t o  s u f -  
f e r  somewhat. F i rms ,  t o  v a r y i n g  d e g r e e s ,  may f i n d  it h e l p f u l  t o  
m a i n t a i n  w a i t i n g  l i s t s  of a c c e p t a b l e  j o b  s e e k e r s  e s p e c i a l l y  where 
such  workers  i n f r e q u e n t l y  approach t h e  f i r m .  By m a i n t a i n i n g  such  
l is ts ,  t h e  f i r m  s h o u l d  b e  a b l e  t o  f i l l  i t s  open ings  more q u i c k l y  
(and a t  a  r e l a t i v e l y  s m a l l  i n c r e a s e  i n  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  c o s t s )  t h a n  
by h i r i n g  a c c o r d i n g  t o  a  b ingo  model. 
Secondly ,  t h e  queue ing  model makes more r e a l i s t i c  i n f o r m a t i o n  
demands on t h e  p a r t  o f  t h e  job s e e k e r .  How would t h e  job-seeker  
g e t  t h e  i n f o r m a t i o n  r e q u i r e d  t o  e s t i m a t e  ' p '  i n  t h e  b ingo  model? 
Newspaper and o t h e r  r e p o r t s  abou t  t h e  expans ion  of  economic ac -  
t i v i t y  i n  a  l o c a l  l a b o u r  market might  be a  common s o u r c e .  The 
job-hunt ing  e x p e r i e n c e s  o f  f r i e n d s  who have r e c e n t l y  s e a r c h e d  i n  
t h a t  market  might  be  a n o t h e r  f r e q u e n t l y - u s e d  s o u r c e .  I t  i s  doubt -  
f u l  i n  e i t h e r  c a s e  t h a t  t h e  j ob  s e e k e r  c o u l d  g e t  enough i n f o r m a t i o n  
t o  have more t h a n  a  v e r y  vague e s t i m a t e  o f  p .  
I n  a  queue ing  model,  t h e r e  a r e  two k i n d s  of  i n f o r m a t i o n  which 
t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  must a c q u i r e .  F i r s t ,  h e  must know p l ;  t h e  proba-  
b i l i t y  of b e i n g  a  s u c c e s s f u l  a p p l i c a n t .  Then, h e  must have some 
i d e a  o f  t h e  e x p e c t e d  t i m e  u n t i l  he  comes t o  t h e  t o p  of  a  w a i t i n g  l i s t .  
To e s t i m a t e  p l ,  h e  must r e l y  on h i s  own p a s t  e x p e r i e n c e s  i n  j o b  
s e a r c h  s i n c e  t h i s  i s  h i s  on ly  g u i d e  t o  h i s  i n t r i n s i c  q u a l i t i e s  
a s  g e n e r a l l y  p e r c e i v e d  by f i r m s .  To e s t i m a t e  w a i t i n g  t i m e s ,  he  
might  r e a s o n a b l y  r e l y  on t h e  y e r s o n n e l  o f f i c e r s  o f  t h e  f i r m  who 
migh t  s a y ,  f o r  example,  "you a r e  a n  a c c e p t a b l e  a p p l i c a n t .  A t  
c u r r e n t  t u r n o v e r  and  expans ion  r a t e s ,  w e  would be  a b l e  t o  h i r e  
you i n  s i x  t o  twe lve  weeks".  A s  h i s  s e a r c h  g e t s  underway, t h e  
j o b  s e e k e r  t h u s  h a s  a  b u i l t - i n  p r o c e s s  by which t o  e s t i m a t e  and  
upda te  p ( t )  w i t h  h i s  marke t  e x p e r i e n c e s .  
F i n a l l y ,  t h e  queue ing  model h a s  a n  advan tage  i n  t e r m s  o f  
i t s  r e l a t i v e l y  s u b j e c t i v e  n a t u r e .  The David-Barrow and Todaro 
app roaches  assume t h a t  ' p '  i s  o b j e c t i v e  and known b e f o r e  t h e  j o b  
s e e k e r  makes h i s  m i g r a t i o n  d e c i s i o n .  The queue ing  model, how- 
e v e r ,  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  ' p '  i s  s u b j e c t i v e .  The m i g r a n t  may e n t e r  a  




w i t h  h i s  own job  s e a r c h  e x p e r i e n c e s .  I n  t h i s  c a s e ,  ' p ' ,  o r  more 
g e n e r a l l y ,  i t s  t i m e  d i s t r i b u t i o n ,  may be changed a c c o r d i n g  t o  
Bayes theorem, . f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  i n  which a  p r i o r  e s t i m a t e  o f  ' p l  i s  
combined w i t h  s e a r c h  (sample)  i n fo rma t ion  t o  y i e l d  a  p o s t e r i o r  
e s t i m a t e  o f  ' p '  . 
The Choice  Problem 
I n  t h i s  s u b s e c t i o n ,  t h e  s p e c i f i c s  of  t h e  c h o i c e  problem 
f a c i n g  t h e  j o b  s e e k e r  a r e  d i s c u s s e d .  What a r e  t h e  c h o i c e  a l t e r -  
n a t i v e s ?  I n i t i a l l y  a  g e n e r a l  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  t h e s e  q u e s t i o n s  i s  
under t aken  h e r e .  Subsequent ly ,  a  s imple  model i l l u s t r a t i n g  some 
of  t h e  i s s u e s  r a i s e d  i s  p r e s e n t e d .  
To t h i s  p o i n t ,  s i m p l e  models o f  j ob  s e a r c h  have been p r e s e n t e d .  
The job-seeker  l o o k s  a t  d i f f e r e n t  l o c a l  l a b o u r  m a r k e t s ,  makes a  
c h o i c e  among them, m i g r a t e s ,  and t h e n  s e a r c h e s  f o r  work. H i s  
c h o i c e  was mere ly  where ( i f  a t  a l l )  t o  m i g r a t e  and how l o n g  t o  
s e a r c h .  S e v e r a l  o b j e c t i o n s  a r e  p o s s i b l e  a b o u t  t h i s  paradigm. 
A s  i n d i c a t e d  e a r l i e r ,  s e v e r a l  r e s e a r c h e r s  might  c r i t i c i z e  t h e  
n o t i o n  t h a t  m i g r a t i o n  and unemployment p r i o r  t o  s e a r c h  i s  t h e  
o n l y  s t r a t e g y  open t o  t h e  job  s e e k e r .  The c h o i c e  a l t e r n a t i v e s  
shou ld  be expanded t o  i n c l u d e  l o n g - d i s t a n c e  s e a r c h  t r a v e l  w i t h  
m i g r a t i o n  o n l y  consequent  t o  s u c c e s s f u l  j ob  f i n d i n g .  
Q t h e r  r e s e a r c h e r s ,  such  a s  Mortensen ( 1 9 7 0 ) ,  have empha- 
s i z e d  t h e  c h o i c e  between f u l l  and p a r t  time s e a r c h .  They see 
t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y ,  i n  o t h e r  words, o f  employed workers  u n d e r t a k i n g  
l i m i t e d  s e a r c h  f o r  new work w h i l e  m a i n t a i n i n g  t h e i r  p r e s e n t  j obs .  
The p r e s e n c e  o f  such p a r t - t i m e  s e a r c h  i n  r e a l i t y  i s  q u i t e  e x t e n -  
s i v e  and  can  n o t  be  ignored .  I n  f a c t ,  s e v e r a l  r e s e a r c h e r s ,  such  
a s  A l c h i a n  (1970; p. 2 9 ) ,  a r e  q u i c k  t o  p o i n t  o u t  t h a t  f u l l - t i m e  
s e a r c h  is  j u s t i f i a b l e  o n l y  i f  it e n a b l e s  more e f f i c i e n t  and pro-  
d u c t i v e  s e a r c h .  T h e r e f o r e ,  D a v i d ' s  view t h a t  s e a r c h  beg ins  o n l y  
w i t h  unemployment res t r ic ts  t h e  a l t e r n a t i v e s  open t o  t h e  j o b  
s e e k e r  i n  r e a l i t y .  H e  t y p i c a l l y  can  engage i n  l i m i t e d  s e a r c h  
w h i l e  m a i n t a i n i n g  a  job ,  change jobs  and move t o  a  p a r t - t i m e  
b a s i s  w i t h  more e x t e n s i v e  s e a r c h  a c t i v i t y ,  o r  q u i t  t o  s e a r c h  
f u l l - t i m e .  A more r e a l i s t i c  model o f  t h e  job  s e e k e r  would make 
i n t e n s i t y - o f - s e a r c h  p a r t  o f  h i s  c h o i c e  problem. 
F i n a l l y ,  i n  t r e a t i n g  t h e  problem of r a t i o n a l  c h o i c e ,  most  
r e s e a r c h e r s  have assumed t h a t  t h e  job s e e k e r  maximizes t h e  ex- 
pec ted  v a l u e  of h i s  d i scoun ted  f u t u r e  e a r n i n g s  s t ream.  Th i s  
i m p l i e s  r i s k  n e u t r a l i t y .  David i s  one  o f  t h e  few t o  c o n s i d e r  
r i s k  a v e r s i o n  a s  a  b a s i s  f o r  r a t i o n a l  decis ion-making under un- 
c e r t a i n t y .  J u s t  what t h e  g a i n s  a r e  i n  moving from s imple  r i s k  
n e u t r a l i t y  t o  o t h e r  r a t i o n a l i t y  assumptions is  an  open q u e s t i o n .  
While Dav id ' s  model, f o r  example, p l a c e s  an emphasis on t h e  va r -  
i a n c e  of  t h e  wage d i s t r i b u t i o n ,  it i s  u n c l e a r  t h a t  a  job-seeker  
would even have enough informat ion  abou t  t h i s  t o  behave p r o p e r l y .  
Unless  a l t e r n a t i v e  models of r a t i o n a l i t y  can  be  developed which 
g e n e r a t e  r e a l i s t i c  d a t a  r equ i remen t s  on t h e  p a r t  o f  job  s e e k e r s ,  
t h e r e  would be l i t t l e  t o  g a i n  from c o n s i d e r i n g  them h e r e .  
Cons ider  t h e  fo l lowing  model, a s  an  example of what c a n  be  
done, w i t h  t h e  f i r s t  i s s u e  r a i s e d ;  t h e  c h o i c e  of  s e a r c h  s t r a t e -  
g i e s .  Imagine two l o c a l  l a b o u r  markets ,  ' a '  and ' b ' ,  i n  which 
t h e r e  a r e  f i x e d  wages, ya and yb,  and f i x e d  p r o b a b i l i t i e s  of  job- 
f i n d i n g ,  pa and pb, r e s p e c t i v e l y .  The c o s t  of m i g r a t i o n  from ' a '  
t o  ' b '  i s  c t h e  c o s t  o f  a  r o u n d - t r i p  s e a r c h  t r i p  is  cs, and t h e  
m'  
d i s c o u n t  r a t e  i s  r .  Of c o u r s e ,  c > c 
S .  
F i n a l l y ,  assume r i s k  
m 
n e u t r a l i t y  on t h e  p a r t  of t h e  job seeke r .  
There a r e  t h r e e  a c t o r s  whose d e c i s i o n s  might  be  e v a l u a t e d .  
The employed worker a t  ' a '  c o n s i d e r i n g  q u i t t i n g  t o  s e a r c h  a t  ' b ' ,  
t h e  unemployed job-seeker  a t  ' a '  c o n s i d e r i n g  which market  t o  
s e a r c h ,  and t h e  unemployed job-seeker  a t  ' b '  c o n s i d e r i n g  a  s i m -  
22 i l a r  q u e s t i o n  . H e r e ,  a t t e n t i o n  i s  focussed  on  t h e  f i r s t  two 
a l though  t h e  t h i r d  can  be  handled i n  a  s i m i l a r  manner. 
S e v e r a l  e a r n i n g s  s t r eams  can be  c a l c u l a t e d .  The pe r son  
p r e s e n t l y  working a t  ' a '  ( o r  b )  has  a  d i s c o u n t e d  s t r eam of  U: 
b ( o r  Ue)  where,  from (1 6 )  
Here, work l i f e  h o r i z o n s  have been ignored  a g a i n .  The unemployed 
job  s e e k e r  a t  ' a '  ( o r  ' b ' )  has  a  s i m i l a r  d i s c o u n t e d  e a r n i n g s  s t r e a m ,  
2 2 ~ i v e n  t h e  s t r u c t u r e  of  t h e  assumpt ions ,  t h e r e  i s  no incen-  
t i v e  f o r  t h e  employed pe r son  a t  ' b '  t o  want a  job  a t  ' a ' .  T h i s  
a c t o r  is  t h e r e f o r e  ignored .  . 
i UU , where 
Given t h a t  a  person makes a  migra t ion  o r  s ea r ch  dec i s i on  
s o  a s  t o  maximize U ,  equa t ions  (18)  and (19)  can be used t o  
i d e n t i f y  an opt imal  cho ice .  For t h e  moment, d i s r e g a r d  d i r e c t  
c o s t s  of  sea rch  and migra t ion  (cs  and c,). The minimum condi-  
t io .ns  f o r  an employed person a t  ' a '  t o  seek work a t  ' b '  i s  
This  a s s e r t s  a  s imple r e l a t i o n s h i p  among t h e  r e l a t i v e  wage r a t e  
a t  ' b ' ,  t h e  l i k e l i h o o d  of f i nd ing  a  job t h e r e ,  and t h e  d i s coun t  
r a t e .  The s i m i l a r  minimum cond i t i ons  f o r  an unemployed worker 
b t o  s e a r c h  a t  ' b '  i s  UU > U: o r  
Th is  i s  s i m i l a r  t o  (20)  except  i n s o f a r  a s  it a l s o  i nc ludes  pa. 
What about  t h e  c h o i ce  of  s ea r ch  s t r a t e g y ?  I f  a  job seeker  
a t  ' a '  migra tes  t o  ' b '  and then s ea r ches ,  h i s  d i r e c t  s ea r ch  c o s t ,  
Sm, i s  an immediate o u t l a y  
I f  he  under takes  s ea r ch  t r a v e l  f i r s t  and mig ra t e s  on ly  i f  a job 
2 3 ~ h i s  i s  a  minimum cond i t i on  because t h e  e x i s t e n c e  of  non- 
ze ro  cm and c s  w i l l  g e n e r a l l y  r e q u i r e  a  l a r g e r  y  /y r a t i o .  b  a  
i s  f oun d ,  t h e  e x p e c t e d  s e a r c h  c o s t ,  Sm, when p r o p e r l y  d i s c o u n t e d  
i s  
The a d v a n t a g e  o f  t h i s  second  s t r a t e g y  i s  t h a t  it a l l o w s  t h e  j o b  
s e e k e r  t o  d e f e r  cm u n t i l  a j o b  i s  found .  The d i s a d v a n t a g e  i s  
t h e  i n i t i a l  o u t l a y  cs r e q u i r e d .  The j o b  s e e k e r  w i l l  choose  t h e  
smaller o f  ( 2 2 )  and  ( 2 3 ) .  H e  w i l l  u n d e r t a k e  p r i o r  s e a r c h  i f  
S < Sm o r  
S 
and  p r i o r  m i g r a t i o n  o t h e r w i s e .  Opt imal  c h o i c e s  f o r  v a r y i n g  com- 
b i n a t i o n s  o f  cm/cs and  p and  a g i v e n  v a l u e  o f  ' r '  are i l l u -  b 
s t r a t e d  i n  F i g u r e  1 . cm 
-
The d e c i s i o n  problem cs 
I 
prob lem i s  t o  d e c i d e  whethei  .I .2 .3 .4 .5 
f a c i n g  t h e  j o b  s e e k e r  a t  14.0 - 
' a '  i s  t h u s  s e p a r a b l e  i n -  
t o  t w o  p a r t s .  F i r s t ,  how 12.0 . 
s h o u l d  ' b '  b e  s e a r c h e d  by 
10.0 . 
a j o b - s e e k e r  a t  ' a ' .  H i s  
o p t i m a l  d e c i s i o n  i s  t o  8 .0 .  




S, = min(Ss,Sm) ( 2 5 )  
2.0 . 
Based o n  t h i s ,  t h e  second  
t o  s e a r c h  ' b '  a t  a l l .  The Figure 1: Optimal Job Finding 
Strategy 
Prior Search 
Prior Migrat ion 
r = 0.08 
2 P b  
job seeker will do this if 
a ub - S* > Ui 
u 
i t (u,e) 
depending, of course, on his current employment status. Thus, 
it is possible to develop relatively simple models which make 
endogenous interesting aspects of the job seeker's decision 
problem not considered by David. 
Priorities in Future Modelling of Job Search and Migration 
Throughout this section, several issues have been raised 
about alternative ways to model or represent job search behav- 
iour. In concluding this section, the most important of these 
need to be re-identified and suggestions made about future 
modelling. 
The most important controversy in job search theory is over 
the relative roles of wage versus job-finding uncertainty. Most 
models, including that of David, assign a central role to the 
dispersion of wages within a labour market in the job search 
process. Is it reasonable to assume however that wage dis- 
persion is so important to prospective in-migrants? Even if it 
is, are not the informational requirements of a model such as 
David's too excessive on the migrant's part to be realistic? 
Finally, is it realistic to think of the wage sampling that 
inevitably accompanies wage dispersion as a common experience 
of job seekers. For all these arguments, Todaro's model of wage 
rates which are fixed within each labour market but vary from 
one local market to the next seems to be an attractive alterna- 
tive. His emphasis on uncertainty about finding a job seems 
preferable because it is more in agreement with everyday ex- 
perience as well as being simpler. 
The second important controversy surrounds the treatment 
of search behaviour over long distances. David's model is the 
only one to consider this and his emphasis on migration and 
unemployment as prior conditions for searching are objectionable. 
Some work must  b e  d o n e  toward  t h e  m o d e l l i n g  o f  l o n g - d i s t a n c e  
s e a r c h  b e h a v i o u r  w i t h o u t  p r i o r  m i g r a t i o n .  Even t h o u g h  c e r t a i n  
a r e a s  a r e  v e r y  a t t r a c t i v e  p l a c e s  t o  l i v e  o r  work, many p r o s p e c -  
t i v e  m i g r a n t s  a r e  u n w i l l i n g  t o  t a k e  t h e  c h a n c e  o f  g i v i n g  up a  
c u r r e n t  l i v e l i h o o d ,  moving l o c k ,  s t o c k ,  and b a r r e l ,  and h o p i n g  
f o r  a  new j o b  upon a r r i v a l .  Many o f  t h e s e  same p r o s p e c t i v e  
m i g r a n t s  however are w i l l i n g  t o  engage  a c t i v e l y  f rom a  d i s t a n c e  
i n  t r y i n g  t o  f i n d  j o b  o p e n i n g s  i n  t h e s e  a r e a s .  The i m p a c t  o f  
t h i s  b e h a v i o u r  i s  n o t  l o s t  on  f i r m s  i n  t h e s e  f a v o u r e d  a r e a s  who 
o b s e r v e  c o n s t a n t  f l o w s  o f  a p p l i c a n t s  o r  a p p l i c a t i o n s  f o r  j o b  
o p e n i n g s .  The modei  d e s c r i b e d  i n  t h i s  p a p e r  i s  o n l y  a  f i r s t  
s m a l l  s t e p  t o w a r d  a b e t t e r  t r e a t m e n t  o f  t h e  a l t e r n a t i v e  s e a r c h  
s t r a t e g i e s  open  t o  s u c h  p r o s p e c t i v e  m i g r a n t s .  
COMPLEMENTARY PERSPECTIVES ON JOB CREATION 
T h e r e  h a v e  b e e n  v e r y  few a t t e m p t s  t o  i n t e g r a t e  a model  o f  
f i r m  b e h a v i o u r  w i t h  a  model  o f  j o b  s e a r c h .  However, t o  con-  
s t r u c t  a dynamic  model  o f  t h e  u r b a n  l a b o u r  m a r k e t ,  some a c c o u n t  
h a s  t o  b e  t a k e n  o f  t h e  j o b  c r e a t i o n  a n d  wage s e t t i n g  b e h a v i o u r  
o f  f i r m s .  The m o s t  a m b i t i o u s  a t t e m p t  h e r e  h a s  b e e n  t h a t  o f  
Mor tenson  ( 1 9 7 0 ) .  T h e r e f o r e ,  t h i s  s e c t i o n  i s  i n i t i a t e d  w i t h  
a r e v i e w  o f  M o r t e n s e n ' s  model .  A  c - r i t i q u e  of  t h i s  a p p r o a c h  i s  
p r e s e n t e d  n e x t  which  e m p h a s i z e s  t h e  t i m e  l a g s  i n d u c e d  by c a p i -  
t a l  c o n s t r u c t i o n  a s  t h e  p r i m a r y  s o u r c e  o f  u n c e r t a i n t y  f a c i n g  
t h e  f i r m .  Some a s p e c t s  o f  r a t i o n a l  f i r m  b e h a v i o u r  u n d e r  t h i s  
s o u r c e  o f  u n c e r t a i n t y  are i n v e s t i g a t e d .  F i n a l l y ,  a n  a s s e s s m e n t  
o f  t h e  v a l u e  o f  a model  b a s e d  on t h i s  c o n c e p t  f o r  t h e  s t u d y  o f  
a g g r e g a t e  u r b a n  g r o w t h  a n d  m i g r a t i o n  i s  made. 
M o r t e n s e n ' s  Model 
Formal  S t a t e m e n t  o f  M o r t e n s e n ' s  Model 
o f  F i r m  H i r i n g  B e h a v i o u r  
Maximize:  
S u b j e c t  t o :  
A s  p a r t  o f  a b road  l a b o u r  m a r k e t  model ,  Mor tensen  c o n s i d e r s  
t h e  f o l l o w i n g  model o f  a t y p i c a l  f i r m  ' i f  . T h i s  f i r m  f a c e s  a 
p e r f e c t l y  e l a s t i c  demand f o r  o u t p u t  a t  a n  f . 0 . b .  p r i c e  pi which  
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may v a r y  f rom o n e  f i r m  t o  t h e  n e x t  . The f i r m  p r o d u c e s  a n  o u t -  
p u t  Qi ( t )  a t  t i m e  ' t '  u s i n g  i t s  l a b o u r  s u p p l y ,  bJi (t) , as t h e  
o n l y  i n p u t .  T h i s  p r o d u c t i o n  r e l a t i o n s h i p ,  which may b e  u n i q u e  
f o r  e a c h  f i r m ,  i s  e x p r e s s e d  m a t h e m a t i c a l l y  i n  e q u a t i o n  ( 2 9 ) .  
F i n a l l y ,  t h e  f i r m  i s  f r e e  t o  set  i t s  own wage ra te ,  w , ( t ) .  From 
t h i s ,  t h e  n e t  r e v e n u e  e a r n e d  by t h e  f i r m ,  R i ( t ) ,  c a n  b e  c a l c u l a t e d  
as i n  ( 2 8 ) .  The f i r m  i s  assumed t o  maximize t h e  d i s c o u n t e d  f l o w  
of  t h e s e  n e t  r e v e n u e s  o v e r  t i m e  as  i n d i c a t e d  i n  ( 2 7 ) .  
The l i n k a g e  w i t h  t h e  b e h a v i o u r  o f  j o b  s e e k e r s  e n t e r s  t h r o u g h  
( 3 0 ) ~ ~ .  The f i r m ' s  wage r a t e  o f f e r  i s  s e e n  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  a n  
a v e r a g e  m a r k e t  wage, ; ( t ) .  The l a r g e r  w i ( t )  i s  r e l a t i v e  t o  
; ( t ) ,  t h e  more a t t r a c t i v e  t h e  f i r m  i s  t o  j o b  s e e k e r s .  However, 
b e c a u s e  j o b  s e e k e r s  ar'e assumed t o  b e  unaware  o f  t h e  e x a c t  o f f e r  
o f  e a c h  f i r m ,  t h e r e  i s  a l i m i t e d  r e s p o n s e  by worke r s  t o  t h e  f i r m ' s  
wage o f f e r  i n  t h e  s h o r t  r u n .  The b e s t  t h e  f i r m  c a n  hope t o  d o  i s  
t o  draw a l a r g e r  p r o p o r t i o n  of  j o b  s e a r c h e r s  who app roach  t h e  
f i r m  d u r i n g  a t i m e  p e r i o d .  T h i s  number o f  s e a r c h e r s  w i l l  i n  t u r n  
depend ,  a t  l ea s t  p a r t l y ,  on  t h e  a g g r e g a t e  number o f  unemployed,  
~ ( t ) ,  s e a r c h i n g  i n  t h e  l o c a l  l a b o u r  m a r k e t .    qua ti on (30 )  asserts 
t h a t  t h e  r e l a t i v e  change  i n  a f i r m ' s  l a b o u r  s u p p l y  o v e r  time i s  
t i e d  t o  t h e s e  two d e t e r m i n a n t s .  I t  i s  n o t e d  i n  c o n c l u d i n g  t h a t  
2 4 ~ h i s  i s  a s l i g h t  s i m p l i f i c a t i o n  o f  M o r t e n s e n ' s  o r i g i n a l  
model which  p e r m i t s  pi t o  v a r y  o v e r  time. 
2 5 ~ .  ( t)  = N ( t + l )  - Ni ( t )  .
1 
no th ing  i s  be ing  s a i d  a b o u t  t h e  f i r m ' s  l a b o u r  supply  i n  t h e  long-  
run .  A higher - than-average  wage, i f  ma in ta ined  i n  a  marke t  w i t h  
a  c o n s t a n t  number o f  unemployed, cou ld  l e a d  t o  an i n f i n i t e l y  l a r g e  
l a b o u r  supp ly  f o r  t h e  f i r m .  
T h e  problem f a c i n g  t h e  f i r m  i s  t o  choose  an op t ima l  t i m e  p a t h  
f o r  i t s  wage o f f e r s ,  w i ( t ) .  T h i s  w i l l  b e  based on e x p e c t a t i o n s  
abou t  f u t u r e  a v e r a g e  wages, w ( t ) ,  and a b o u t  unemployment l e v e l s  
i n  t h e  l o c a l  marke t ,  U I t ) .  I n  a t t e m p t i n g  t o  i n c r e a s e  n e t  r eve -  
nues by i n c r e a s i n g  i t s  l a b o u r  supp ly ,  t h e  f i r m  w i l l  be b road ly  
c o n s t r a i n e d  by t h e  c o s t s  of  i n c r e a s i n g  i t s  l a b o u r  supp ly  t o o  
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r a p i d l y  
A C r i t i q u e  of  Mor tensen ' s  Approach 
A major  shor tcoming of Mor tensen ' s  approach  i s  t h a t  i n  one  
s e n s e  it i s  concerned  w i t h  t h e  long-run .  I n  it,  t h e  f i r m  f a c e s  
no demand c o n s t r a i n t s .  I t  c a n  s e l l  any l e v e l  of  o u t p u t ,  w i t h i n  
a  broad r ange ,  a t  t h e  same p r i c e ,  pi .  Moreover, t h e  f i r m  i s  a b l e  
t o  h i r e  and p u t  t o  u s e  any amount of l a b o u r ,  a g a i n  w i t h i n  a  broad  
r ange ,  t h a t  would b e  for thcoming a t  i t s  chosen wage r a t e .  P r e -  
sumably, t h e r e  a r e  o t h e r  i n p u t s  t o  t h e  p r o d u c t i o n  p r o c e s s ,  such  
a s  f i x e d  c a p i t a l ,  b u t  marg ina l  u n i t s  of  t h e s e  can  be p u t  i n t o  
p l a c e  immediately a s  t h e  supp ly  of l a b o u r  changes.  I n  s h o r t ,  
Mortensen h a s  c o n s t r u c t e d  a  long  run  model o f  t h e  f i r m  c o n s t r a i n -  
ed i n  t h e  s h o r t - r u n  by i t s  l a b o u r  supp ly .  H e  t o t a l l y  i g n o r e s  
o t h e r  demand o r  i n p u t  supply  c o n s t r a i n t s  which might  a r i s e  i n  t h e  
s h o r t  run .  
T h i s  i s  a  c r i t i c a l  o v e r s i g h t  i n  view of t h e  s h o r t - r u n  n a t u r e  
of  t h e  j o b  s e a r c h  p r o c e s s .  I n  Mor tensen ' s  model, unemployment 
e x i s t s  s o l e l y  because  o f  wage ' shopp ing '  by t h e  unemployed. How- 
e v e r ,  t h e  f i r m  may a l s o  c o n t r i b u t e  t o  unemployment i n  t h e  s h o r t -  
run  by be ing  u n a b l e  t o  h i r e  w i l l i n g  job  s e e k e r s .  T h i s  cou ld  
o c c u r  e i t h e r  because  t h e  f i r m  f a c e s  o u t p u t  demand c o n s t r a i n t s  
o r  because  it h a s  l i m i t e d  s u p p l i e s  of  r e q u i r e d  complementary i n -  
p u t s  such  a s  f i x e d  c a p i t a l .  A more comple te  model o f  t h e  s h o r t -  
run  would b e g i n  t o  c o n s i d e r  t h e  f i r m  under  m u l t i p l e  k i n d s  of  
c o n s t r a i n t s .  
2 6 ~ h e  f i r m  may a l s o  b e  c o n s t r a i n e d  i f  t h e r e  a r e  d e c r e a s i n g  
r e t u r n s  t o  s c a l e  i n  t h e  p r o d u c t i o n  f u n c t l o n  ( 2 9 ) .  
In the remainder of this paper, one particular kind of con- 
straint is considered; the supply of fixed capital. The firm 
at any point in time is seen to have an 'inherited' capital 
stock which it seeks to couple efficiently with labour in a 
production process. This inherited capital stock is seen to 
be determined effectively by a past investment decision. If, 
in making that prior investment decision, the firm had know- 
ledge of its future available labour supply, it would behave 
according to Mortensen's model. However, uncertainty about the 
future labour supply may lead to situations in which the firm 
over or underbuilds a fixed capital stock in relation to the 
labour supply which materializes. In these cases, the firm may 
be either labour or capital constrained with different impli- 
cations for its'behaviour in the labour market. 
A second criticism of Mortensen's model should be noted. 
Although he develops a complete model of labour market dynamics 
including the job search process, he considers only a single 
labour market in which the aggregate labour supply is growing 
at a constant rate. Although he does consider part-time search 
by employed workers, the flow of acceptable job seekers (or 
applicants) to a given firm is partly determined by the stock 
of local unemployed job seekers. If one is to extend Mortensen's 
model to a multi-market environment or to one which is open in 
that migration is permitted, the specification of (30) will have 
to be altered. Instead of the number of locally unemployed, one 
of the determinants of the firm's available labour supply should 
be the flow of job applicants. This, in turn, would depend on 
the available search channels and strategies for both local and 
long-distance search as well as on the number of job seekers in 
various local labour markets. It is at this point that inte- 
gration of job search and job creation models will occur. 
A final criticism of Mortensen's model is its emphasis on 
wage dispersion. It has already been argued that job search 
models designed to explain inter-area migration might better de- 
emphasize wage dispersion and emphasize job finding probabilities. 
If that intuitively-asserted and yet-to-be-empirically-shown ar- 
gument is accepted, it suggests that the model of the firm should 
have a different emphasis. Less importance should be attached to 
firm wage-setting and more to other determinants of the firm's 
demand for labour. This is an additional reason for develo~ins 
the theme of the occasionally capital-constrained firm in this 
paper. It is consistent with a de-emphasis on wage dispersion in 
job search models. 
Job Creation by Firms under Labour Supply Uncertainty - 
In order to investigate some characteristics of a model in 
which firms are uncertain about the future labour supply, it is 
necessary to make several assumptions. These will be kept broad- 
ly in spirit with those of filortensen and will be expanded to get 
around the criticisms raised above. 
Let us begin by assuming that the firm 'i' operates in com- 
petitive markets. It can sell any output it produces at a fixed 
feo.b. price, p, as assumed by Mortensen. Further, it can Pur- 
chase any amount of fixed capital at a fixed rental rate, 'r', 
corresponding to the normal rate of return on capital. Finally, 
it can also purchase labour at a fixed wage rate, 'w'. There is 
a maximum labour supply, Li(t), available to firm 'i' at time 
(t) at this wage. The firm may choose to use only part of this 
supply (at the same wage) but cannot exceed Li(t) under any cir- 
cumstances.  his is in distinction to Mortensen's model where 
the firm can effectively vary Li(t) by changing its wage offer. 
The firm is thus seen to view wage changes on its own part as 
ineffective in altering its labour supply. 
Further, assume that the firm has constant returns to scale 
in its production process which involves fixed capital and labour. 
Variable returns were allowed for by Mortensen but this merely 
added a complicating constraint to the labour demand relationship. 
Using a constant-returns-to-scale model helps to make clear the 
exact role of anticipatory behaviour by firms in the labour mar- 
ket. Subsequent empirical and theoretical models can make more 
realistic assertions and add another layer of complexity. 
The firm now has, because of constant returns to scale and 
fixed prices, certain fixed optimal ratios. Suppose the firm 
knows beforehand what Li(t) will be. Investment can be undertaken 
t o  e n s u r e  t h a t  t h e  o p t i m a l  l e v e l  of  j ob  openings  (fii(t)),  t h e  
o p t i m a l  c a p i t a l  s t o c k  (ki ( t )  1 ,  and t h e  o p t i m a l  o u t p u t  l e v e l  
( G i  (t)), s a t i s f y  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  
The c o n s t a n t s  ki and qi r e f l e c t  t h e  f i r m ' s  p r o d u c t i o n  t echno logy  
and t h e  r a t i o  w / r .  F u r t h e r ,  t h e  f i r m  e a r n s  a  maximum ' e x c e s s '  
- 
pro f  it,  n i  ( t )  , g i v e n  by 27 
jji(t) = p i Q i ( t )  - r k .  ( t )  - w f i i ( t )  
1 
The maximum e x c e s s  p r o f i t s  p e r  j o b  opening  a r e  t h u s  
Thus,  t h e  f i r m ' s  o p t i m a l  e x c e s s  p r o f i t s  p e r  j o b  is  i ndependen t  
o f  i t s  s c a l e  o f  o u t p u t  and t i m e  i n  t h i s  model. Excess  p r o f i t s  
a r e  l i m i t e d ,  i n  a g g r e g a t e ,  o n l y  by t h e  a v a i l a b i l i t y  of l a b o u r .  
To comple te  t h i s  model,  add t h e  f o l l o w i n g  a s sumpt ions .  
Assume t h a t  one  t i m e  p e r i o d  i s  r e q u i r e d  t o  p u t  f i x e d  c a p i t a l  
28 i n t o  p l a c e  . I n  o t h e r  words,  a t  t i m e  ' t - 1 '  t h e  f i r m  must de-  
c i d e  on k i ( t )  and  make a  c o r r e s p o n d i n g  i n v e s t m e n t ,  I i ( t - 1 ) .  
The f i x e d  c a p i t a l  s t o c k  i s  assumed t o  d e p r e c i a t e  a t  a f i x e d  r a t e ,  
d .  T h e r e f o r e  t h e  i d e n t i t y  f o l l o w s  t h a t  
2 7 ~ h e s e  are e x c e s s  i n  t h e  s e n s e  t h a t  ' no rma l '  p r o f i t s  r R i ( t )  
have  been d e d u c t e d .  
2 S ~ h e  l a g  o f  one  p e r i o d  i s  a r b i t r a r y .  The e s t i m a t e  i s  t h a t  
up t o  t h r e e  y e a r s  i s  r e q u i r e d  t o  p u t  new f i x e d  c a p i t a l  i n  p l a c e  
depending  on t h e  s c a l e  and n a t u r e  of  t h e  new f a c i l i t i e s .  
These assumptions make t h e  f i l -mYs a c t u a l  l e v e l  of p r o f i t s  a t  ' t '  
dependent on i t s  a b i l i t y  t o  e s t i m a t e  a t  ' t - I '  what t h e  maximum 
labour  f o r c e  a t  t ime I t '  w i l l  be.  Only by doing t h i s  can t h e  
f i r m  uncler.talre t h e  irlvestment r equ i red  t o  o b t a i n  t h e  opt imal  
c a p i t a l  s tock  a t  ' t ' . 
The f i rm g e n e r a l l y  w i l l  n o t  know how much l a b o u r  w i l l  be 
forthcoming when it makes i t s  investment d e c i s i o n  a l though it 
may be a b l e  t o  s p e c i f y  t h e  l i k e l i h o o d  of a l t e r n a t i v e  labour  f o r c e  
r e a l i z a t i o n s .  For t h i s  r eason ,  t h e  f i r m ' s  p r o f i t  l e v e l  may be  
thought  t o  he s u b j e c t  t o  a  s t o c h a s t i c  component. It is  assumed 
t h a t  t h e  f i r m  seeks  t o  minimize t h e  l o s s  a r i s i n g  from i t s  un- 
c e r t a i n t y .  
The d i s c u s s i o n  s o  f a r  l a y s  t h e  ground f o r  t h r e e  main ques-  
t i o n s .  What. do w e  mean by L i ( t ) ;  t h e  'maximum' l abour  f o r c e  
a v a i l a b l e  t o  f i r m  ' i '  a t  t i m e  ' t ' ?  How does t h e  f i r m  p r o j e c t  
t h e  l i k e i i h o o d  f u n c t i o n  f o r  a l t e r n a t i v e  r e a l i z a t i o n s  of  L i ( t )  
a t  t ime ' t - I u ?  What l e v e l  of  c a p i t a l  investment  does  t h e  f i rm 
undertake given i t s  knowledge of t h i s  l i k e l i h o o d  f u n c t i o n ?  For 
s i m p l i c i t y ,  t h e s e  q u e s t i o n s  a r e  perhaps b e s t  approached i n  re- 
v e r s e  o r d e r .  
Optimal C a p i t a l  Investment  
Under t h e  above assumptions,  how would t h e  f i r m  dec ide  on i t s  
f u t u r e  c a p i t a l  s t o c k  requi rements  and i t $  correspdnding l e v e l  of  
job openings.  The opt imal  investment  cho ice  i s  going t o  depend 
on t h e  1-ikel ihood f u n c t i o n  of d i f f e r e n t  l abour  f o r c e  r e a l i z a t i o n s  
and on t h e  d i f f e r e n t  c o s t s  of  over  and undershooting t h e  r e a l i z e d  
l abour  f o r c e .  F u r t h e r ,  t h e  c o s t  of overshoot ing  i n  p a r t i c u l a r  is 
i t s e l f  dependent on t h e  t e c h n o l o g i c a l  a b i l i t y  of  t h e  f i r m  t o  sub- 
s t i t u t e  abundant c a p i t a l  f o r  s c a r c e  l a b o u r  i n  t h e  s h o r t  run .  
An impor tant  conc lus ion  is t h a t  t h e  opt imal  c a p i t a l  s t o c k ,  
K . ( t ) ,  may he s u b s t a n t i a l l y  d i f f e r e n t  from t h e  c a p i t a l  s t o c k ,  
I. 
k i ( t )  a p p r o p r i a t e  t o  t h e  expected va lue  of t h e  l abour  f o r c e ,  
t i( t)  (where k i ( t )  = k . i . ( t ) ) .  
1 1  
2 9  Genera l ly ,  t h e  c o s t s  of under- 
shoo t ing  one u n i t  a r e  t h e  foregone excess  p r o f i t s  t h a t  could  
have been earned i f  t h e  number of  job openings had been one 
2 9  oo 
= \, z g t - l  (Z)dZ where gt-, ( Z )  i s  t h e  l i k e l i h o o d  
f u n c t i o n  a t  1 f o r  L i . ( t )  being r e a l i z e d  a t  Z .  
l a r g e r .  The c o s t  o f  o v e r s h o o t i n g  t h e  l a b o u r  supp ly  by one u n i t  
i s  rough ly  t h e  r e n t a l  c o s t  o f  t h e  unused o r  i n e f f i c i e n t l y  u sed  
c a p i t a l  s t o c k .  The f i r s t  of  t h e s e  i s  t h e  l a r g e r  i f  and o n l y  i f  
- 
t h e  o p t i m a l  e x c e s s  p r o f i t  p e r  u n i t  l a b o u r  ( E , ' N ) ~  i s  l a r g e r  t h a n  
t h e  normal r a t e  o f  r e t u r n  on c a p i t a l ,  n.  Thus,  a  f i r m  which 
min imizes  t h e  expec ted  v a l u e  of  i t s  over -  and unde r - shoo t ing  
c o s t s  w i l l  t e n d ,  where t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  d i s t r i b u t i o n  of  L ; ( t )  i s  
I 
symmetr ica l  a b o u t  ii(t) t o  have ki ( t )  > k i ( t )  when ( n j ~ )  > n 
and v i c e  v e r s a .  T h i s  i s  an  e x a c t  d e s c r i p t i o n  when no s h o r t - r u n  
s u b s t i t u t i o n  e x i s t s  between l a b o u r  and c a p i t a l .  P e r m i t t i n g  such  
h 
s u b s t i t u t i o n  i n c r e a s e s  t h e  l i k e l i h o o d  t h a t  t i ( t )>  K i ( t )  by low- 
e r i n g  t h e  c o s t s  of  o v e r s h o o t i n g .  Thus,  how t h e  f i r m  comes t o  
- 
d e c i d e  on t h e  .va lue  of  K i ( t )  under  u n c e r t a i n t y  depends on more 
t h a n  mere ly  e x p e c t a t i o n s  a b o u t  t h e  f u t u r e  l a b o u r  supp ly .  
T h i s  argument  c a n  be  s t a t e d  i n  ma thema t i ca l  form3'. Assume 
t h a t  t h e  f i r m  h a s  a  L e o n t i e f  p r o d u c t i o n  f u n c t i o n  w i t h  a  f i x e d  
c a p i t a l - l a b o u r  r a t e  o f  ' k i l  and a  f i x e d  o u t p u t - l a b o u r  r a t i o  ' q i l .  
Given t h a t  a  l a b o u r  f o r c e  L i ( t )  i s  a v a i l a b l e  a t  ' t ' ,  t h e  employ- 
a b l e  c a p i t a l  s t o c k  i s  k i L i ( t ) .  I f  t h e  f i r m  h a s  a  c a p i t a l  s t o c k ,  
K i ( t ) ,  which exceeds  t h i s ,  t h e  f i r m ' s  l o s s ,  R ,  due  t o  u n c e r t a i n t y  
i n  t h e  p e r i o d  i s  t h e  r e n t a l  on t h e  unused c a p i t a l .  
I f  t h e  f i r m  h a s  an  i n s u f f i c i e n t  c a p i t a l  s t o c k ,  t h e  c a p i t a l  s t o c k  
c o n s t r a i n s  t h e  l e v e l  o f  j o b  open ings  t o  ( l / k i ) K i ( t )  and t h e  l e v e l  
o f  o u t p u t  t o  (qi/ki)Ki ( t )  . The f i r m ' s  u n c e r t a i n t y  l o s s  now i s  
t h e  f o r e g o n e  p r o f i t s  t h a t  c o u l d  have been ea rned  on t h e  unused 
l a b o u r .  
3 0 ~ a i f f a  and S c h l a i f e r  ( 1  961 ; Chapter  6) d i s c u s s  t h e  p r o p e r t i e s  
o f  L i n e a r  Loss  F u n c t i o n s  o f  which t h e  p r e s e n t  model i s  a  s p e c i a l  case. 
The expec ted  v a l u e  of  t h e  f i r m ' s  l o s s  i s  t h u s  
Minimizing t h i s  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  K i ( t ) ,  o r  e q u i v a l e n t l y  ~ ~ ( t ) ,  
y i e l d s  t h e  f i r s t - o r d e r  c o n d i t i o n  t h a t  
- r k .  
where 
Thus,  .the f i r m  o p t i m a l l y  chooses  t h a t  l e v e l  of  job  open ings  ( o r  
c a p i t a l  s t o c k )  such t h a t  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  of  a  l a b o u r  f o r c e  r e a l i -  
z a t i o n  exceeding  i t  i s  e q u a l  t o  t h e  r a t i o  o f  normal p r o f i t s  t o  
t o t a l  (normal p l u s  e x c e s s )  p r o f i t s .  A s  a  c o r o l l a r y ,  i f  t h e  ex- 
cess p r o f i t s  a r e  e q u a l  t o  t h e  normal p r o f i t s  and t h e  qt_!(.) 
d j - s t r i b u - t i o n  i s  symmetr ic ,  t h e  f i r m  would choose t o  s e t  N i  (t)  
= L i ( t ) .  
To c a r r y  t h i s  example f u r t h e r ,  suppose t h a t  g  ( 9 )  i s  a  
t - 1  
normal d i s t r i b u t i o n  w i t h  mean f , .  ( t )  and v a r i a n c e  a?  ( t )  . The 
1 1 
o p t i m a l  l e v e l  o f  j ob  open ings  f o r  any r a t i o  o f  rki  t o  piqi-w i s  
h 
d i s p l a y e d  i n  F i g u r e  2 .  I n  mathemat ica l  t e rms ,  N i ( t )  can  be ex- 
p r e s s e d  a s  f o l l o w s  
where u ( . ) is  t h e  monotonical ly i n c r e a s i n g  f u n c t i o n  d i s p l a y e d  
i n  F igure  2 .  I f  it i s  f u r t h e r  assumed t h a t  o i ( t )  i s  propor-  
t i o n a l  t o  ti ( t )  , then  
N i  ( t)  = aiLi ( t )  (43) 
where 
and 
Thus, t h e  op t ima l  l e v e l  of job openings h e r e  i s  p r o p o r t i o n a l  t o  
t h e  expected  l abour  f o r c e  under t h e s e  a d d i t i o n a l  assumptions.  
Leaving t h i s  example, it i s  noted  t h a t ,  f o r  s e v e r a l  r easons ,  
a  f i r m  may d e l i b e r a t e l y  choose t o  h a v e a  K i ( t )  which i s  n o t  equa l  
t o  k i ( t )  ( o r  k . N .  ( t ) ) .  One reason i s  t h a t  k i ( t )  < ( 1 - d ) ~ = ( t - l ) .  
1 1  
I n  t h i s  c a s e ,  t h e  f i r m  f a c e s  a  c o r n e r  s o l u t i o n  where it chooses 
t o  have no g r o s s  inves tment .  Because demol i t ion  of t h e  c a p i t a l  
F i g u r e  2 :  Optimal C a p i t a l  Investment  and J o b  c r e a t i o n  
stock is assumed to be expensive, the firm finds it optimal to set 
Ki(t) = (1-d)Ki(t-1) and wait for depreciation to bring the capi- 
tal stock eventually to its optimal lower level. A second reason 
is related to this first. Although Ri(t) may be larger than (1-d) 
K, (t-1) , the firm might observe that in two (or more) time periods 
I 
ahead, Ci (t+l) < 1 -  Ei t . In these cases, the labour force 
might, for instance, be .expected to fluctuate over time. The firm 
will find it optimal to take some account of the permanency of the 
labour supply with the consequence that the single-period optimized 
k .  (t) may be replaced by a lower longer-run optimum31. A third 
1 
reason might have to do with decreasing returns to scale in the 
investment process itself. Although it has here been assumed that 
each monetary unit of investment yields the same unit increment in 
capital stock, some researchers have shown that a relaxation of 
their assumptions to include decreasing returns would generate a 
32 partial adjustment investment model . 
The firm finds it advantageous to undertake only a portion of the 
aggregate gross investment required to achieve the optimal stock 
because of the diseconomies of rapid capital stock growth. 
Proiectina the Labour S u ~ ~ l v  Likelihood Function 
To this point, the implications of labour supply uncertainty 
for the level of investment have been traced. Let us now examine 
how the firm forms, at 't-l', its anticipations about the shape 
of the probability distribution, gt-l ( ' 1  , underlying Li (t) . 
The likelihood function may be thought of in either subjective 
or objective terms. Because we are principally interested in the 
behaviour of the firm, it is more useful to inquire about the like- 
lihood function as perceived (subjectively) by the firm. Given the 
difficulty of formulating such a function, it might be expected 
3 1 ~ n  analogous argument for the demand (rather than labour) 
constrained firm is found in Birch and Siebert (1976). 
32~rossa~an ( 1 972) has developed this partial adjustment model 
under this assumption. 
that a firm would rely on a simple model. Therefore, it is as- 
sumed here that gtFl(*) is a subjective likelihood function de- 
scribable at most by two parameters, the mean and variance. How 
might the firm go about estimating these two terms? 
First, how might the firm estimate the expected value of 
next period's maximum labour supply c .  (t) . The expected future 
1 
labour supply could be related to the recent size of or growth 
in labour force. For example, ei(t) might be an extrapolation 
of Li(t-1) or an extrapolation of the growth over two previous 
periods. 
ti (t) = ZiRLi(t-1) where g > 0 iR 
These two alternative hypotheses make current capital investment 
and job creation dependent on the previous level(s) of labour 
force supply. An alternative hypothesis is that firms expect 
the labour supply to be able to expand job openings at a con- 
stant rate. A simple model of this form is 
h 
Li (t) = ZinNj (t-1) (49) 
In this model, the growth of jobs would be, in effect, independ- 
ent of the actual labour supply. These two kinds of models, 
where either labour force or job openings grow at a constant 
33 
rate, are the most commonly used in the literature . 
This approach is quite mechanical, however, in that the firm 
is presumed to exogenously specify the growth rates, ZiR, Zin, 
or gi. There is no process described whereby firms come to 
3 3 ~ s  one example of (4 1). Mortensen ( 1  970) con'structs a .labour 
market model in which the urban labour force grows at a constant 
rate. Further this rate is known by firms. As an example of 
(49), Todaro (1969) assumes that employment grows at an exoge- 
nously-given rate. 
forrn such a ~ i t i c i p a t i o n s .  F u r t h e r ,  such  e x p e c t a t i o n s  a r e  n o t  
s een  .to be  mod i f i ed  th rough t ime  a s  t h e  f i r m ' s  e x p e r i e n c e s  i n  
t h e  l a b o u r  marke t  e v o l v e .  A l t e r n a t i v e  app roaches  which make 
a n t i c i p a t i o n s  endogenous a r e ,  however, q u i t e  r a r e  i n  t h e  lit- 
e r a t u r e .  
A u s e f u l  way t o  approach  a l t e r n a t i v e  p e r s p e c t i v e s  i s  t o  
i n q u i r e  about  t h e  i n f o r m a t i o n  c h a n n e l s  t h rough  which a  f i r m  
might  escpec,t t o  l e a r n  how many workers  might  be for thcoming .  
The f i r m  i n  i t s  s e a r c h  f o r  i n f o r n ~ a t i o n  abou t  t h e  l o c a l  l a b o u r  
iliarket rnay r e l y  on two k i n d s  of s o u r c e s ;  i n t r a - f i r m  and e x t r a -  
f i r m .  Ex t r a - f i rm  s o u r c e s ,  such  a s  l a b o u r  f o r c e  s u r v e y s ,  cen-  
s u s ? ~ ,  t a x  a s se s smen t  d a t a ,  b u i l d i n g  p e r m i t  r e c o r d s ,  and o t h e r  
Aatz, u s u a l l y  g i v e  i n d i c a t i o n s  of t h e  a g g r e g a t e  growth of t h e  
l v c a l  l a b o i ~ r  inarket .  I nc luded  i n  t h i s  d a t a  may be  s h o r t - t e r m  
f o r e c a s t s  o f  t h e  u rban  a r e a ' s  development.  The f i r m  r e c o g n i z e s  
l?o>~ever t h a t  .the c o n n e c t i o n  between a g g r e g a t e  growth and t h e  
f u t u r e  l a b o u r  supp ly  for thcoming  t o  t h e  f i r m  i s  n o t  mechanica l  
or  a u t o m a t i c .  The f i r m  must a d d i t i o n a l l y  u s e  i n t r a - f i r m  s o u r c e s  
t o  e v a l u a t e  t h e  p a s t  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between a g g r e g a t e  l a b o u r  mar- 
k e t  growth and t h e  f i r m ' s  e a s e  i n  a t t r a c t i n g  new l a b o u r .  F o r  
a  v a r i e t y  o f  r e a s o n s  s p e c i f i c  t o  t h e  f i r m  and i t s  g e o g r a p h i c a l  
s e . t t i n j ,  .the f i r m  may b e  f i n d i n g  it i n c r e a s i n g l y  e a s i e r  o r  more 
d i f f i c u l t  t o  a t . t . r ac t  a  c e r t a i n  q u a l i t y  o f  l a b o u r  g i v e n  a  r a t e  
of a g g r e g a t s  l a b o u r  marke t  growth.  
I n s t e a d  of  u s i n g  a  combina t ion  of  i n t r a  and e x t r a  f i r m  d a t a  
s o u r c e s ,  t h e  f i r m  may choose  t o  u s e  s t r i c t l y  i n t e r n a l  informa- 
t i o n  c h a n n e l s .  I t  inay watch t h e  q u i t  r a t e  of  employees,  t h e  
ave rage  amount of  t i m e  r e q u i r e d  t o  f i l l  a  v a c a n t  j ob  opening ,  
t h e  r a t e  o f  o f f - t h e - s t r e e t  j ob  a p p l i c a t i o n s ,  and t h e  c u r r e n t  
i n v e n t o r y  o f  j o b  a p p l i c a t i o n s  f o r  example. With such  informa-  
t i o n  a t  hand, t h e  f i r m  would e x t r a p o l a t e  i n  e s t i m a t i n g  how long  
i:l: woul.il t a k e  t o  fill t h e  j o b  openings  c r e a t e d  by an  expans ion  
of p r o d u c t i v e  f a c i l i t i e s .  
I n  e i t l i e r  c a s e ,  t h e  f i r m  i s  a t t e m p t i n g  t o  e s t i m a t e  and re- 
spond t o  local .  l a b o u r  marke t  c o n d i t i o n s .  I f ,  u s i n g  e x t r a - f i r m  
c h a n n e l s ,  it p e r c e i v e s  a n  i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  l a b o u r  supp ly  r e l a t i v e  
to demand it will be profitable for the firm to increase invest- 
ment. Similarly, an increase in aggregate unemployment will 
lead to an increase in the rate of off-the-street job applica- 
tions and in the inventory of recent applicants while decreasing 
the amount of time required to fill a vacant position. To the 
extent that higher unemployment makes job search more competitive 
and less fruitful, it also discourages employed workers from 
34 quitting to search for better work . Thus, intra- fir^ and extra- 
firm channels both emphasize labour market fluidity or tightness. 
In the discussion on job search behaviour, an emphasis has 
been placed on the process by which searchers sample firms for 
job vacancies. It seems appropriate here to emphasize the role 
that this sampling plays in the investment decisions of firms. 
Therefore, let us assume that the firm uses tnl Elow of 'accept- 
able' job applicants as its only gauge of the patential labour 
supply available to it. This is similar to Mortensen's approach 
except that this flow need no longer be strictly related to the 
level of local unemployment. 
Labour market conditions may change over the period between 
the investment decision and the point at which the fixed capital 
becomes productive. The firm must, at time t-1 use the then- 
current flow of applicants as a proxy for the same flow at 't'. 
This poses some risks for the firm in that an investment de- 
cision based on the flow at It-1' may turn out, as indicated 
in the previous subsection, to be quite inappropriate at 't'. 
The concept of an 'acceptable' applicant requires clarifi- 
cation. So far, job openings and labour force members have 
been treated as broadly homogeneous. There are, however, many 
peculiarities about a job opening at a particular firm such as 
hours of work, location, employment stability, work environ- 
ment, and advancement opportunities. As argued earlier, even 
if all firms offer an identical wage, a particular job seeker 
may be willing or unwilling to accept a position with a given 
firm. Similarly, a firm may view different applicants in dif- 
ferent ways; age, skills, sex, education, past employment re- 
cord, work attitude, and initiative are among the attributes 
34~mpirically, this has been illustrated by Holt (1 970, p. 
60) for the U.S.A. 
 ons side red^^. The hypo thes i s  i s  forwarded t h a t  t h e  number of 
' a c c e p t a b l e '  a p p l i c a n t s ,  E i ( t ) ,  t o  f i r m  ' i t  a t  t ime I t '  i s  
p r o p o r t i o n a l  t o  t h e  t o t a l  number of a p p l i c a n t s ,  A i ( t )  , i n  t h e  
same pe r iod .  
36 The p ropor t ion  p . ( t )  can vary from one f i r m  t o  t h e  n e x t  . 
1 
The f i r m  must now f i x  a t  I t - I '  a  l e v e l  of job  openings ,  
N i ( t ) ,  t o  be mainta ined a t  ' t ' .  The a c t u a l  l e v e l  of employment, 
A however, i s  N .  ( t)  where 
1 
A N .  ( t )  = min [Li (t)  , Ni ( t )  1 
1 
(51 
A Thus, N i ( t )  depends on whether t h e  f i r m  is  c a p i t a l - c o n s t r a i n e d  
o r  l abour -cons t ra ined .  A t  I t - l ' ,  t h e  f i r m  has  an  e x p e c t a t i o n  
about  t h e  f u t u r e  l abour  supply  forthcoming t o  it. This  supply 
is  made up of two components; t h e  new h i r i n g s  and t h e  remaining 
employees from t h e  p rev ious  t ime pe r iod .  The s t o c k  of  r e t a i n e d  
employees i s  expected  t o  d e c l i n e  because of  q u i t s .  Q u i t s  a r e  
e f f e c t e d  by workers f o r  s e v e r a l  reasons  a s  i n d i c a t e d  e a r l i e r  
a l though  one main reason  i s  s e a r c h  f o r  a  b e t t e r  job37. The f i r m  
e x p e c t s  a  c e r t a i n  q u i t  r a t e ,  Y i ( t ) ,  equal  t o  t h e  a c t u a l  q u i t  
3 5 ~ i m i l a r  arguments about  t h e  uniqueness of job openings 
and job  s e e k e r s  and t h e  d i f f i c u l t y  of matching t h e  two have 
been made by Toikka ( 1  974, p. 63) . 
3 6 ~ o t h  Mortensen and Mirman and P o r t e r  ( 1  974) assume t h a t  
t h e  f i r m  can a l t e r  i t s  f low of  accep tab le  a p p l i c a n t s  by vary- 
ing  i t s  wage r a t e  r e l a t i v e  t o  o t h e r  f i r m s .  This  p o s s i b i l i t y  
is  excluded h e r e  by t h e  assumption of a  f i x e d  wage r a t e .  
3 7 ~ o r t e n s e n ,  among o t h e r s ,  sugges t s  t h a t  q u i t s  t o  sea rch  a r e  
n e g a t i v e l y  r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  l e v e l  of unemployment. This  i s  con- 
s i s t e n t  w i t h  t h e  job  s e a r c h  behaviour d e s c r i b e d  e a r l i e r  because 
a  lower l e v e l  of unemployment g e n e r a l l y  impl ies  a  g r e a t e r  s t o c k  
of job vacanc ies  and a  s h o r t e r  expected unemployment d u r a t i o n .  
rate  a t  ' t - l ' ,  y i ( t - 1 ) .  The expec ted  l e v e l  o f  new h i r i n g s  i s  
t h e  e x p e c t e d  f l o w  of a c c e p t a b l e  a p p l i c a n t s ,  k i ( t ) .  I t  i s  a s -  
sumed t h a t  ei ( t)  = Ei (t- 1 ) . Thus, t h e  f i r m  e x p e c t s  a l a b o u r  
f o r c e  a t  time ' t '  of 
The a c t u a l  l a b o u r  f o r c e  r e a l i z e d ,  by c o n t r a s t ,  i s  
The d i s c r e p a n c y  between e x p e c t a t i o n  and r e a l i z a t i o n  o c c u r s  because  
o f  changes  i n  t h e  q u i t  r a t e  and i n  t h e  f l ow o f  a c c e p t a b l e  a p p l i -  
c a n t ~ ~ ~ .  When one t h i n k s  o f  t h e  d e n s i t y  f u n c t i o n  gtwl ( ~ ~ ( t ) )  o f  
l a b o u r  s u p p l y  r e a l i z a t i o n s ,  it i s  u n c e r t a i n t y  a b o u t  t h e s e  two 
which u n d e r l i e s  it. 
How does  a f i r m  go a b o u t  p r o j e c t i n g  t h e  e n t i r e  f u n c t i o n  g ( * ) ?  t- 1 
A s  a r g u e d  e a r l i e r ,  ' g '  is  p e r h a p s  b e s t  t r e a t e d  a s  a s i m p l e  f u n c t i o n .  
While  some arguments  may b e  made f o r  having  t h e  f i r m  e s t i m a t e  ' g '  
o n  t h e  b a s i s  o f  a sample of i t s  p r i o r  q u i t  r a t e s  and a p p l i c a n t  
f l o w s ,  t h i s  would s e e m  t o  b e  u n r e a l i s t i c .  A f i r m  l i k e l y  works 
s imp ly  w i t h  a n  e x p e c t e d  v a l u e  and some r e l a t e d  v a r i a n c e  estimate. 
A s  assumed earl ier ,  t h e  f i r m  might  s imp ly  t r e a t  t h e  s t a n d a r d  de-  
v i a t i o n  of L i ( t )  as p r o p o r t i o n a l  t o  L i ( t ) .  Under t h i s  assumpt ion  
( 5 2 )  d i c t a t e s  t h e  e n t i r e  shape  o f  gt  - 
The F i r m ' s  Labour Supply  
The p r e c e d i n g  d i s c u s s i o n  h a s  s e r v e d  t o  c l a s i f y  what w e  mean 
by  t h e  maximum l a b o u r  s u p p l y  a v a i l a b l e  t o  a f i r m .  I n  t h e  s h o r t -  
r u n  wor ld  o f  t h i s  t h e o r y ,  a l i m i t e d  number o f  a c c e p t a b l e  j o b  
3 8 ~ h e  d i s c r e p a n c y  between t h e  r e a l i z a t i o n  o f  a l a b o u r  f o r c e  
s u p p l y  and t h e  l e v e l  of j o b  open ings  makes n e c e s s a r y  t h e  d i s t i n -  
g u i s h i n g  of a n  ' a c c e p t a b l e '  a p p l i c a n t  from a n  a c c e p t e d  one .  
Even if a n  a p p l i c a n t  i s  a c c e p t a b l e  t o  t h e  f i r m  and t h e  f i r m  ac-  
c e p t a b l e  t o  him, t h e  l a c k  o f  j o b  open ings  may make a f i r m  u n a b l e  
t o  t a k e  him on.  
s e e k e r s  w i l l  approach  t h e  f i r m  i n  s e a r c h  of  work. Even though 
i n  t h e  l o n g e r  run  a l a n g e  number of workers  might  be  w i l l i n g  t o  
work f o r  a g i v e n  f i r m ,  it t a k e s  t i m e  f o r  t h e s e  workers  t o  f i n d  
t h e  f i r m .  T h e r e f o r e ,  i n  t h e  s h o r t - r u n ,  t h e  f i r m  i s  q u i t e  con- 
s t r a i n e d  i n  i t s  growth  by t h e  number of unemployed p e r s o n s ,  t h e  
p a t t e r n s  of job  s e a r c h ,  and more g e n e r a l l y  by t h e  i g n o r a n c e  of 
l a b o u r  f o r c e  members a b o u t  a l t e r n a t i v e  j o b  openings .  
Can t h e  f i r m  a f f e c t  t h e  s i z e  of  i t s  a v a i l a b l e  l a b o u r  supp ly?  
I n  r e a l i t y ,  it can  and it h a s  a t  l e a s t  two s t r a t e g i e s  f o r  do ing  
t h i s .  One :is t o  r a i s e  i t s  wage o f f e r  r e l a t i v e  t o  o t h e r  f i r m s  
competing f o r  l a b o u r  i n  t h e  same l a b o u r  supp ly  a r e a .  Most j o b  
s e a r c h  models emphasize  t h i s  a l t e r n a t i v e .  The second would be 
t o  a l t e r  i t s  work environment  s o  a s  t o  make it more a c c e p t a b l e  
t o  j o b  s e e k e r s  o r  t o  lower  i t s  s t a n d a r d s  a s  t o  what c o n s t i t u t e s  
a n  a c c e p t a b l e  job-seeker .  Both of t h e s e  s t r a t e g i e s  e s s e n t i a l l y  
i n v o l v e  i n c r e a s i n g  P i ( t ) .  I n  t h i s  s e n s e ,  t h e  f i r m  h a s  some f r e e -  
dom t o  select  P i ( t ) .  I n  do ing  s o ,  it weighs t h e  p r o f i t s  g a i n e d  
from a l a r g e r  l a b o u r  supp ly  a g a i n s t  t h e  e x t r a  c o s t s  (wages o r  
overhead)  which t h i s  e n t a i i s .  
A a s r e s a t e  Urban J o b  C r e a t i o n  and Labour Market Models 
I n  t h i s  s u b s e c t i o n ,  L e t  u s  c o n s i d e r  t h e  i m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  b o t h  
t h e  Mortensen model and t h e  new framework d e s c r i b e d  above f o r  em- 
p i r i c a l  models o f  u rban  job  c r e a t i o n .  The Mortensen model i s  
q u i t e  c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  t h a t  of  David and t h e  p a i r  a r e  shown t o  
c o n s t i t u t e  a u n i f i e d  b a s i s  f o r  a f u l l  l a b o u r  mdike t  model. The 
a l t e r n a t i v e  view o f  j ob  c r e a t i o n  behaviour  d e s c r i b e d  i n  t h i s  pa- 
p e r  i s  more c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  t h e  a l t e r n a t i v e  p e r s p e c t i v e s  on job  
s e a r c h  behaviour .  However, any a t t e m p t  t o  l i n k  t h e s e  two l a t t e r  
k i n d s  o f  models i s  shown t o  p r e s e n t  a major  un re so lved  problem.  
How have a g g r e g a t i v e - e m p i r i c a l  models of  j ob  c r e a t i o n  been  
fo rmula t ed?  The most common approach i s  t o  assume t h a t  t h e  num- 
b e r  of  j o b  open ings  i n  a l o c a l  a r e a  is de te rmined  by t h e  l e v e l  
o f  ' e x p o r t s '  of goods o r  services t o  o t h e r  a r e a s ,  X ( t ) .  
Sometimes X ( t )  i s  r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  Gross Na t iona l  Product  of t h e  
r e l e v a n t  n a t i o n .  Sometimes $ ( t ) ,  t h e  p r o p o r t i o n a l  f a c t o r ,  i s  
r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  l o c a l  supply  of f i x e d  c a p i t a l  o r  t o  t h e  mix be- 
tween i n d u s t r i e s  geared  t o  e x p o r t  product ion  v e r s u s  t h o s e  o r i -  
e n t e d  t o  s a t i s f y i n g  l o c a l  demands. I n  any c a s e ,  t h e  l e v e l  of  
job openings i s  seen t o  be exogenous w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  l o c a l  l a -  
bour market c o n d i t i o n s .  When such models a r e  p a r t  of a  f u l l  
l abour  market model, a  u n i - d i r e c t i o n a l  c a u s a l  s t r u c t u r e  i s  
p o s i t e d .  Changes i n  exogenous c o n d i t i o n s  a l t e r  t h e  l e v e l  of  
job openings which i n  t u r n  a f f e c t s  t h e  flow of job  s e e k e r s .  No 
r o l e  f o r  h o u s e h o l d - i n i t i a t e d  u r b a n i z a t i o n  i s  p o s s i b l e  h a r e .  
The on ly  o t h e r  common e m p i r i c a l  model i s  t h a t  s i m i l a r  t o  
Muth (1971) .  Here, t h e  growth i n  t o t a l  job openings ( o r  employ- 
ment) i s  r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  growth of t h e  l o c a l  l abour  f o r c e  a s  w e l l  
a s  o t h e r  f a c t o r s .  I f  L ( t )  i s  t h e  t o t a l  l abour  f o r c e  i n  an  a r e a ,  
t h e n  
would be a  s imple  v e r s i o n  o f  t h i s .  Such a model makes t h e  l e v e l  
of job  openings dependent on t h e  growth of t h e  l abour  f o r c e  a l o n e .  
Changes i n  t h e  l e v e l  of job openings a r e  n o t  seen  as a  response  
t o  such l o c a l  l abour  market  c o n d i t i o n s  as wages o r  unemployment 
however. 
Mortensen s u g g e s t s ,  i n d i r e c t l y ,  t h a t  (55)  i s  i n c o r r e c t  under 
h i s  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of t h e  l abour  market .  He env i sages  a c l o s e d  
l a b o u r  market w i t h  a  stoclc of unemployed, U (.t-1) , a t  t ime ' t-1 ' . 
H e  f u r t h e r  assumes t h a t  t h e  number of f i r m s  i n  t h e  l o c a l  l a b o u r  
market  i s  l a r g e  bu t  f i x e d .  Given t h a t  each f i r m  s e l e c t s  i t s  r e -  
l a t i v e  wage r a t e ,  (30) can  be summed over  a l l  f i r m s  t o  y i e l d ,  a s  
a  s p e c i a l  c a s e ,  t h e  fo l lowing  aggrega te  form. 
The c o n s t a n t  n 1  r e f l e c t s  both  t h e  i n t e n s i t y  of s e a r c h  by j o b  
s e e k e r s  and t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  of wage o f f e r s  among f i r m s .  Here, 
(56)  d i f f e r s  from (55) i n  t h a t  job  c r e a t i o n  i s  l i n k e d  t o  t h e  
d e g r e e  of  d i s e q u i l i b r i u m  i n  t h e  l a b o u r  marke t  r a t h e r  t han  t o  t h e  
growth o f  t h e  l a b o u r  supply .  I f  one a c c e p t s  Mor t ensen ' s  n o t i o n s ,  
(56)  i s  s u p e r i o r  t o  (55)  because  it more c l o s e l y  r e p r e s e n t s  t h e  
p r o c e s s  by which j o b  h i r i n g  d e c i s i o n s  a r e  unde r t aken .  
Although Mortensen c o n s i d e r s  o n l y  a  s i n g l e  u rban  l a b o u r  mar- 
k e t ,  one assumpt ion  made by him p r o v i d e s  t h e  u n i f y i n g  l i n k  w i t h  
D a v i d ' s  model. Mortensen has  assumed t h a t  h i s  l a b o u r  marke t  i s  
c l o s e d .  Tha t  i s ,  j o b  s e e k e r s  who s e a r c h  i n  t h e  l o c a l  marke t  a r e  
assumed t o  r e s i d e  t h e r e .  T h e r e f o r e ,  U ( t )  = L ( t )  - ~ ( t ) , ~ ~ .  T h i s  
i s  e q u i v a l e n t  t o  D a v i d ' s  n o t i o n  o f  m i g r a t i o n  a s  a  p r e r e q u i s i t e  
f o r  s e a r c h .  
The two models a r e  e a s i l y  combined. Assume t h a t  t h e  l o c a l  
l a b o u r  f o r c e  h a s  a  r a t e  of  n a t u r a l  i n c r e a s e  which i s  f i x e d  a t  
g R  
. F u r t h e r ,  assume t h a t  (11)  i s  a n  a p p r o p r i a t e ,  i f  s i m p l i f i e d  
a g g r e g a t i o n  o f  D a v i d ' s  model. T h i s  y i e l d s  a  comple te  l a b o u r  
marke t  model o f  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  form. 
I t  i s  r ecogn ized  t h a t  ao ,  a l l  and a2 a r e  r e s p o n s i v e  t o  ' h i d d e n '  
v a r i a b l e s  such  a s  t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  of  wages w i t h i n  t h e  l o c a l  
marke t  and c o n d i t i o n s  i n  o t h e r  l o c a l  l a b o u r  marke t s .  However, 
t h i s  sys tem of  e q u a t i o n s  d o e s  p r o v i d e  a  r e l a t i v e l y  s i m p l e  model 
of  u rban  l a b o u r  marke t  dynamics which emphasizes  a  p a r t i c u l a r  
concep t  o f  t h e  s e a r c h  p r o c e s s .  
3 9 ~ o t e  t h a t  i n  Mor t ensen ' s  model, a  j o b  opening  i s  c r e a t e d  
f o r  e a c h  w i l l i n g  a p p l i c a n t .  Thus, t h e r e  i s  an  e x a c t  co r r e spon-  
dence between open ings  and employment. T h i s  i s  a  d i s t i n c t i o n  
from t h e  j o b  c r e a t i o n  model d .er ived i n  t h i s  pape r .  
Mortensen's model shares the faults found in David's model 
as well. In particular, it ignores the possibility of long- 
distance search travel. The number of job seekers looking in 
a given labour market for work can be substantially different 
from the number of unemployed currently residing there. There- 
fore the flow of acceptable job seekers need not be rllU(t-1) or 
any function of U (t-1 ) . Equations (58) and (60) force too re- 
strictive a view of the job search and hiring process. They 
thus limit the means by which household-initiated urbanization 
can occur. 
The alternative approaches to job search and job creation 
modelling discussed in this paper are as yet incomplete. How- 
ever, some progress toward an aggregate model is possible. 
Suppose, as did Mortenson, that are a fixed number, m, of firms 
in a given local labour market at every point in time. Then 
(43), (52), and (50) can be aggregated from the firm to the 
local market level. This yields 
where 
- 
Here, a ( t )  may va ry  w i t h  t h e  r a t i o  of  excess  t o  normal p r o f i t s  
and y ( t )  may v a r y  w i t h  t h e  p r o f i t a b i l i t y  o f  sea rch .  A s  a  f i r s t  
approximation however, t h e  system (61 ) - ( 6 3 )  i s  a  s imple  b u t  t e l -  
l i n g  model of aggrega te  job. c r e a t i o n  behaviour  i n  t h r e e  v a r i a b l e s .  
The l e v e l  o f  job  openings i s  determined by t h e  a n t i c i p a t e d  l a b o u r  
supply.  Th i s  i s  t i e d  t o  t h e  q u i t  r a t e  and t h e  f low of  a c c e p t a b l e  
a p p l i c a n t s .  F i n a l l y ,  t h e  f low of a c c e p t a b l e  a p p l i c a n t s  i s  t i e d  
t o  t h e  t o t a l  f low of  job a p p l i c a t i o n s  d u r i n g  a  p e r i o d .  
The major source  of  incompleteness a t  t h i s  s t a g e  comes i n  t h e  
s p e c i f i c a t i o n  of  t h i s  l a t t e r  v a r i a b l e ,  E ( t ) .  What de te rmines  t h e  
f low of job  a p p l i c a t i o n s ?  The answer must come from a  f u l l  model 
of job s e a r c h  behaviour .  The a n a l y s i s  i n  s e c t i o n  2 of  t h i s  paper  
i s  in tended  t o  l a y  t h e  groundwork f o r  t h a t  model. S i n c e  a  job  
a p p l i c a t i o n  can  t a k e  many forms rang ing  from a  g a t e  a p p l i c a t i o n  
t o  a  w r i t t e n  e n q u i r y ,  a  f u l l  job  s e a r c h  model must c o n s i d e r  many 
sampling o r  a p p l i c a t i o n  s t r a t e g i e s  each w i t h  i t s  own a r r a y  of  
c o s t s  and expected  b e n e f i t s .  So f a r ,  o n l y  a  p a r t i a l  a n a l y s i s  has  
been undertaken o f  t h e  c o n d i t i o n s  under  which a  p r b s p e c t i v e  job- 
s e e k e r  would (i) d e c i d e  t o  under take  s e a r c h ,  (ii) d e c i d e  how t o  
c a r r y  o u t  s e a r c h ,  and (iii) d e c i d e  where t o  sea rch .  
CONCLUDING COMMENT 
The development of a  b e t t e r  model o f  job s e a r c h  i s  no t r i v i a l  
e x e r c i s e .  I f  one i s  t o  p u t  t h e  household v e r s u s  i n d u s t r y -  
i n i t i a t e d  u r b a n i z a t i o n  con t rover sy  t o  a  t r u e  t e s t ,  a  more through 
t r e a t m e n t  of  job  s e a r c h  behaviour  i s  r e q u i r e d .  When a  f i r m  i s  
t r y i n g  t o  d e c i d e  where t o  l o c a t e  o r  t o  expand, it w i l l  t a k e  ac-  
count  o f  more than  j u s t  t h e  l o c a l  supply  o f  labour .  I t  w i l l  a l s o  
u s u a l l y  c o n s i d e r  t h e  l i k e l i h o o d  t h a t  t h e  r e q u i r e d  workers  can  be 
a t t r a c t e d  t h e r e  i f  n o t  a v a i l a b l e  l o c a l l y .  How w i l l  it measure 
t h i s ?  One s o u r c e  might be t h e  f low of  job a p p l i c a t i o n s  t o  t h e  
f i r m  i f  it is a l r e a d y  i n  t h e  a r e a .  Another might be t h e  c a s e  o f  
s i m i l a r  f i r m s  a l r e a d y  i n  t h e  a r e a  i n  a t t r a c t i n g  workers .  Th i s  
i n  f a c t  would o f t e n  seem t o  be more impor tant  t o  f i r m s  than  t h e  
a v a i l a b l e  l o c a l  l a b o u r  i n  p l a c e  a l r e a d y .  However, it is  t h e  
households again, who through their locational preferences are 
shaping the spatial pattern of industry here. As long as simple 
models such as (57) - (60) are used to test the household-initiated 
urbanization hypothesis, they will fail to consider this perhaps 
more important impact of household preferences. The time has 
come for a deeper treatment of labour market processes. It is 
hoped that this paper will help to spur and direct that research 
effort. 
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